Analysis of Air Force Office of Special Investigations Agents' Knowledge of the Contract Management Process by Menanno, John & George, Mark
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Acquisition Research Program Acquisition Research Symposium
2015-12-01
Analysis of Air Force Office of Special
Investigations Agents' Knowledge of the
Contract Management Process
Menanno, John; George, Mark
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/53553
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
NPS-CM-16-003 
 
ACQUISITION RESEARCH PROGRAM 
SPONSORED REPORT SERIES 
  
Analysis of Air Force Office of Special Investigations Agents’ 




Capt Mark E. George, USAF 
 
Special Agent John A. Menanno, USAF 
 
Thesis Advisors:  Dr. Juanita M. Rendon, Lecturer 
Dr. Rene G. Rendon, Associate Professor 
 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
Prepared for the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943. 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy 
























The research presented in this report was supported by the Acquisition Research 
Program of the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval 
Postgraduate School. 
To request defense acquisition research, to become a research sponsor, or to print 
additional copies of reports, please contact any of the staff listed on the Acquisition 
Research Program website (www.acquisitionresearch.net).
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - i - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
ABSTRACT 
The Department of Defense has an annual budget of approximately $495 billion. 
With such substantial resources being used to fund supplies, services, and weapons systems, 
auditability becomes vital to protecting against fraud, waste, and abuse. A hallmark of an 
auditable organization is competent personnel. To defend against and identify procurement 
fraud, a competent workforce must include both acquisition personnel and procurement 
fraud investigators. 
The purpose of this research is to assess the Air Force Office of Special 
Investigation’s procurement fraud agents’ knowledge of the contract management process 
and procurement fraud schemes, as well as evaluate their perceptions of knowledge in these 
areas. This research used an online assessment tool. Results from the assessment indicate 
that, despite having a high perception of knowledge, procurement fraud agents generally 
scored low in each of the knowledge-based question categories. Based on the results of the 
analysis, the research presents recommendations and areas for further research. 
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Each year, the Department of Defense (DOD) spends billions of dollars 
purchasing services and supplies to execute its mission. Many of these procurements are 
conducted through government contracts, which, due to the complex nature of the 
programs, lack of experience of the acquisition workforce, and inadequate acquisition 
planning and contract support, leave the DOD vulnerable to fraudulent activity 
(Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2015; Headquarters Air Force Office of 
Special Investigations [HQ AFOSI/XRG], 2009). In fact, due to these issues, the DOD 
contract management has been on the GAO’s High Risk Series since 1992 (GAO, 2015). 
For an organization to protect against fraud, it must be auditable. Auditability 
means there is a document trail that someone can follow to know exactly what happened 
and why. Auditability enables the government to maintain an image of “integrity, 
accountability, and transparency” by employing competent people, implementing capable 
processes, and instituting effective internal controls (Rendon & Rendon, 2015, p 1). In 
the context of DOD acquisition, the phrase “competent people” means the contracting 
workforce is knowledgeable in contracting. Competent people also include those who 
investigate procurement fraud. When fraudulent activity is discovered or suspected 
within  the  Air  Force,  allegations  are  reported  to  the  Air  Force  Office  of  Special 
Investigations (AFOSI) for investigation. 
Established in 1948, AFOSI is a federal law enforcement and investigative agency 
for the Department of the Air Force (Hagerty, 2008). In this capacity, AFOSI’s mission is 
to “identify, exploit and neutralize criminal, terrorist and intelligence threats to the Air 
Force, Department of Defense and U.S. Government” (Air Force Office of Special 
Investigations [AFOSI] Public Affairs Office, 2011). AFOSI has approximately 2,300 
federally credentialed special agents to execute its mission, with a portion of its resources 
dedicated to investigating procurement fraud (AFOSI Public Affairs Office, 2011). 
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As procurement within the DOD came under scrutiny for fraud, waste, and abuse, 
AFOSI created the Office of Procurement Fraud, where special agents have a specific 
mission to detect and investigate procurement fraud within the Air Force (C. King, 
personal communication, July 1, 2015). For this reason, AFOSI trains all agents on the 
fundamental aspects of procurement fraud schemes. There is also advanced training 
available for agents who specialize in procurement fraud investigations. This training 
covers investigative techniques and an analysis of procurement fraud indicators, and 
takes an in-depth look at various procurement fraud scheme case studies. Although the 
additional training is not mandatory for agents, it is highly encouraged by AFOSI 
leadership (C. King, personal communication, July 1, 2015). By broadening the 
knowledge base for AFOSI special agents with regard to the contract  management 
process  and  their  relationship  to  procurement  fraud  schemes,  AFOSI  will  be  better 
postured to identify fraud earlier in the contract management process. 
B. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of this research is to assess AFOSI’s procurement fraud agents’ 
knowledge of the contract management process and procurement fraud schemes, as well 
as to evaluate their perception of knowledge in these areas. Results from the analysis may 
be utilized to identify areas for improvement as well as to make recommendations to 
enhance AFOSI’s training curriculum, which may improve agent training on the contract 
management process and procurement fraud schemes. A greater level of knowledge may 
also foster stronger relationships with contracting agencies and improve the capabilities 
and efficiencies of the investigative process. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research questions for this research include the following: 
1. What are AFOSI procurement fraud agents’ knowledge levels of the 
phases of the contract management process? 
What are AFOSI procurement fraud agents’ knowledge levels of 
contracting as related to procurement fraud schemes? 
2. 
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3. What are AFOSI procurement fraud agents’ perceptions of their 
knowledge of the contract management process and procurement fraud 
schemes? 
D. BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS 
This research assesses the contract management process and procurement fraud 
knowledge levels of AFOSI’s procurement fraud agents and may identify areas for 
improvement to the current AFOSI economic crimes training curriculum. This research 
may assist AFOSI leadership in identifying future areas of training emphasis for 
procurement fraud investigators. With better training, AFOSI agents will be in a better 
position to analyze government contracts, and identify and investigate procurement fraud 
schemes. 
This research also led to the development of an assessment tool to test the level of 
knowledge among AFOSI procurement fraud agents on the contract management process 
and procurement fraud schemes. This research tool may be refined and used for further 
research within other investigative services both inside and outside the DOD. 
Limitations to this research include the validity of the survey instrument used as 
an assessment tool, the sample size of individuals that completed the survey, and the 
deployment method of the assessment tool. Information to develop the assessment tool 
was taken from the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), National Contract 
Management Association (NCMA) certification study guides, and the researchers’ own 
experiences. Another limitation is that the survey contained a limited number of 
questions per contract management process and procurement fraud schemes. The number 
of questions asked may not be enough to accurately determine agents’ knowledge levels 
of contract management process and procurement fraud schemes. 
Yet another limitation to this research is the potential for survey participants to 
receive assistance from outside sources because the agents were not monitored during the 
assessment. Other limitations include agents who failed to complete the survey or who 
answered questions without giving serious thought to their answers (e.g., rushed through 
the survey or selected random answers). This could cause the results and statistical 
analysis to become skewed. 
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E. METHODOLOGY 
The foundation of this research is a comprehensive literature review on the 
contract management process and major procurement fraud schemes. In addition, this 
research presents a background on AFOSI, which includes details on the training 
requirements for special agents as well as advanced training available for agents 
investigating procurement fraud. To gain an adequate understanding of AFOSI 
procurement fraud training, both basic and advanced course material was reviewed. This 
information was also used to assist in the development of a survey instrument, which 
served as the assessment tool to collect primary data for this research. AFOSI leadership 
granted permission to survey all current agents assigned to procurement fraud units. The 
appropriate Institutional Review Board (IRB) procedures were followed. Agents who 
participated in this research took the survey online at their workstations and within their 
own schedule constraints. 
In addition to AFOSI course information, survey questions were derived from 
previously developed and employed surveys, the FAR, NCMA certification study guides, 
as well as the researchers’ own experiences and expertise. The questions have differing 
levels of difficulty and focus on areas unfamiliar to AFOSI agents. The survey questions 
were analyzed by subject matter experts for readability, understandability, and clarity. 
The survey was deployed using LimeSurvey and was available for approximately five 
weeks. The survey assessed AFOSI agents’ knowledge of the contract management 
process as well as procurement fraud schemes within the phases of the contract 
management process. The survey also included questions to assess agents’ perceptions of 
their knowledge in these areas. Survey results were analyzed using descriptive statistics 
and used to identify areas of improvement for AFOSI training. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT 
This research paper contains six chapters. Chapter I serves as an introduction and 
provides a general overview of the research. Chapter II is a literature review detailing the 
DOD procurement environment, the need for auditability, and a discussion of the contract 
management process and procurement fraud schemes. Chapter III outlines the history of 
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AFOSI and provides a synopsis of the training required as well as additional optional 
training available for AFOSI agents assigned to units primarily focused on investigating 
procurement fraud. Chapter IV presents the methodology used to develop and deploy the 
assessment tool and collect data, as well as describe how the responses were analyzed 
using descriptive statistics. Chapter V discusses the results of the survey, provides an 
analysis of the results, and provides recommendations on how to improve training for 
agents assigned to units within the AFOSI Office of Procurement Fraud. Chapter VI 
provides  a  summary and  conclusion  of  the  research  and  identifies  areas  for  further 
research. 
G. SUMMARY 
This chapter introduced the research, the benefits and limitations, the 
methodology used to collect and analyze the data, and the organization of this report. The 
purpose of this research is to assess AFOSI’s procurement fraud agents’ knowledge of 
the contract management process and procurement fraud schemes, as well as to evaluate 
their perception of knowledge in these areas. The next chapter, Chapter II, comprises a 
literature review of the need for auditability, contract management process, and the major 
procurement fraud schemes. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter II summarizes the literature on the contract management process and 
procurement fraud schemes. This chapter draws heavily from research by Chang (2013) 
on the Army’s Mission Installation Contracting Command (MICC). Chang assessed 
contracting personnel’s knowledge of procurement fraud schemes as related to the 
contract management process and internal controls. The purpose of this research is to 
assess the Air Force Office of Special Investigation’s (AFOSI) procurement fraud agents’ 
knowledge of the contract management process and procurement fraud schemes, as well 
as to evaluate their perception of knowledge in these areas. 
This chapter presents a brief synopsis of the Department of Defense (DOD) 
procurement fraud environment, which includes a general discussion of the auditability 
triangle. A detailed description of the contract management process is also presented. The 
major procurement fraud schemes that are common in federal contracting are also 
discussed.  Finally,  this  chapter  discusses  the  “competent  people”  component  of  the 
auditability triangle, which is the focus of this research. 
B. PROCUREMENT FRAUD ENVIRONMENT 
In 2014, the Department of the Navy became engulfed in one of the largest 
bribery and conspiracy cases in recent history. The chief executive officer (CEO) of 
Glenn Defense Marine Asia (GDMA), Leonard Glenn Francis, a former defense 
contractor known as “Fat Leonard,” was charged with defrauding the government of 
millions of dollars during the execution of ship husbanding services throughout the 
Southeast Asia area of responsibility (AOR) (Adams, 2015). Several high-ranking Navy 
officials pleaded guilty to charges of bribery and conspiracy for releasing confidential 
information to Fat Leonard in return for various bribes and kickbacks. As of December 
2015, the case was still ongoing. Cases such as this highlight the DOD’s need for strong 
fraud prevention measures. 
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The DOD budgets approximately $495 billion annually due to an increased 
reliance on contracted supplies and services to execute its mission both at home and 
abroad (GAO, 2015). This increased use of contracting has created a demand for 
auditability in government operations. As Rendon and Rendon (2015) found, 
“auditability is needed by procurement agencies to ensure the integrity, accountability, 
and transparency of its procurement programs and is an organization’s first line of 
defense in the battle against procurement fraud” (p. 3). The three components of the 
auditability triangle are effective internal controls, capable processes, and competent 
people (Rendon & Rendon, 2015). If an organization lacks in one of these areas, it may 
become vulnerable to fraud. 
The first component of the auditability triangle is effective internal controls. 
Effective internal controls consist of five components: “control environment, risk 
assessment, control activates, information and communications, and monitoring. The 
objectives of these five components are for the organization to achieve ‘effectiveness and 
efficiency of operations, reliability of financial reporting, and compliance with applicable 
laws and regulations’” (Chang, 2013, p. 15; General Accounting Office, 1999). The GAO 
(2014) updated its report on Standards for Internal Controls and found that effective 
internal  controls  safeguard  the  contract  management  process  and  reduce  the  risk  of 
procurement fraud. 
The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) was founded in 1988 with 
the intention of “reducing the incidence of fraud and white-collar crime” (ACFE, 2014, p. 
1). The ACFE estimates that “typical organizations lose 5 percent of revenues each year 
to fraud” (ACFE, 2014, p. 4). The DOD is no exception and is vulnerable to fraud, waste, 
and abuse. Tan’s (2013) research analyzed 20 fraud cases from GAO and DODIG reports 
and found that weaknesses in internal controls within the contract management process 
led to fraud incidents, including incidents in the Air Force. The GAO placed the DOD’s 
contract management on its High Risk Series in 1992 due to weaknesses in five key 
areas: “sustained senior leadership, capable acquisition workforce, adequate pricing, 
appropriate contracting approaches and techniques, and sufficient contract surveillance” 
(GAO, 2006, p. 2). The GAO (2015) posted an update to its Report to Congressional 
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Committees on High-Risk Series in February 2015, stating that the DOD has partially met 
the criteria in each of these areas. However, the DOD remains on the high-risk list for the 
areas  that  must  still  be  improved.  Furthermore,  DODIG  continues  to  identify  fraud 
indicators in various phases of the contract management process (DODIG, 2015). 
The second component of the auditability triangle requires a capable contract 
management process. These processes are in place to make sure that the government 
provides companies a fair opportunity to be awarded a contract and ensure that the 
taxpayers’ money is managed properly. The next section covers the contract management 
process. 
C. CONTRACT MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
Contract management consists of both the buying (government) and selling 
(contractor) entities and involves specific roles and responsibilities pertaining to each. 
The interaction between these entities to obtain supplies and services is controlled by the 
contract management process. This section defines the phases of the  contract 
management process from the buyer’s perspective. This includes procurement planning, 
solicitation planning, solicitation, source selection, contract administration, and contract 
closeout (Rendon & Snider, 2008). 
1. Procurement Planning 
Procurement planning involves “the process of identifying which business needs 
can be best met by procuring products or services outside the organization” (Rendon & 
Snider, 2008, pp. 165–166). The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) (2015) requires 
each agency to perform acquisition strategy planning. The agency determines whether 
procurement is the right option, how to obtain the supply or service, what supply or 
service to buy, the quantities to buy, and the right time to procure. Some of the critical 
steps involved in procurement planning include “defining the requirement (supply or 
service to procure) in a statement of work (SOW), and performance work statement 
(PWS); and conducting market research” (Rendon & Snider, 2008, p. 166). These steps 
are covered in detail in the following subsections. 
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a. Defining the Requirement 
The most important part of procurement planning is defining the requirement. 
Contracting officers work with government customers to 
government  needs  to  execute  the  mission.  According  to 
(2011),  agencies  must  describe  the  government’s  needs 
determine what exactly the 
Cibinic,  Nash,  and  Yukins 
in  terms  of  the  following: 
“function, so that a variety of products or services may qualify; performance, including 
specifications  of  the  range  of  acceptable  characteristics  or  minimum  acceptable 
standards; or design requirements” (p. 363). 
During requirements definition, it is critical that requirements owners identify 
how the requirement was obtained or fulfilled in the past and how long the requirement 
will be needed (Chang, 2013). Furthermore, some additional areas that must be 
considered include whether the organization will perform the function internally, 
externally, or both. This is referred to as the make or “buy decision” (Chang, 2013). 
Finally, if the organization determines that the requirement should be fulfilled externally, 
requirements owners should identify if the requirement can be fulfilled by another 
government organization or if they will have to execute a contract with a private 
contractor (Chang, 2013). Answering these questions will focus the acquisition team 
towards the best method for contracting and move the requirement through the process. 
b. Conducting Market Research 
Once the agency has defined its requirement, market research must be conducted 
to determine the way forward. The FAR defines market research as “collecting and 
analyzing information about capabilities within the market to satisfy agency needs” (FAR 
2.101, 2015). The extent to which market research is conducted depends largely on the 
following factors: intricacy of the requirement, urgency, and anticipated dollar value of 
the requirement. Methods of market research include reviewing catalog prices, and 
comparing previous acquisition history (FAR 15.201). In addition, market research also 
includes conducting pre-solicitation conferences with potential bidders, issuing draft 
solicitations  with  draft  SOW  (covered  in  the  next  section),  issuing  requests  for 
information on the government point of entry, and issuing a sources-sought synopsis, etc. 
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(FAR 15.201). Market research also reveals whether commercial or nondevelopmental 
items could fulfill the government’s requirement and whether there are large or small 
businesses that can perform the work or supply the items (FAR 10.001). 
c. Developing Requirements Documents 
Once the agency has defined the requirement adequately, the information is 
captured on documents that will become part of the solicitation package upon which the 
industry will bid. The type of document describing the agency’s need issued to vendors 
will depend on the complexity and associated risk. Rendon and Snider (2008) identified 
government specifications, statements of objectives (SOOs), SOWs, and PWSs as 
requirements  documents.  The  following  is  a  list  of  various  types  of  requirements 
documents as stated in the sources indicated: 
Specifications describes the technical requirements for items, materials 
and services, including the procedures by which it will be determined the 
requirements have been met. Specifications can be design or performance 
specifications (Rendon & Snider, 2008, p, 167). 
Statement of Objectives (SOO) outlines required performance objectives 
and is used to give the contractor maximum flexibility to meet the 
requirement (FAR 2.101). 
Statement of Work (SOW) provides all nonspecification requirements for 
contractor’s efforts either directly or with use of specific cited documents 
(Rendon & Snider, 2008, p, 167). 
Performance Work Statement (PWS) means a statement of work for 
performance-based acquisitions that describes the required results in clear, 
specific and objective terms with measurable outcomes (FAR 2.101). 
Procurement planning sets the stage for the rest of the acquisition process. This phase can 
be quite lengthy and if “a procurement is not well planned; it can lead to numerous 
problems that waste the time and funds of the government and offerors” (Cibinic et al., 
2011, p. 279). 
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2. Solicitation Planning 
Solicitation planning involves compiling documents for the solicitation. During 
this phase, the procurement team determines the appropriate procurement method and 
contract type, develops the solicitation document, develops proposal evaluation criteria, 
structures contract terms and conditions, and finalizes requirements documents (Rendon 
& Snider, 2008). 
a. Procurement Methods 
In federal contracting, specific dollar thresholds determine the procedures used in 
awarding contracts. Micro-purchase transactions (less than $3,500) are typically handled 
by  delegated  cardholders  using  the  Government-wide  Purchase  Card 
13.003; 13.201). Simplified acquisition procedures (SAP) are designed 
purchases  between  $3,500  and  $150,000  (FAR  13.003).  SAP  may 
(GPC)  (FAR 
to streamline 
be  used  for 
commercial  items  up  to  $7  million.  In  times  of  emergency  or  contingencies,  these 
thresholds may be raised (FAR 13.5). 
The two primary procurement methods prescribed by the FAR are sealed bidding 
and contracting by negotiations for any acquisition anticipated to exceed $150,000. Any 
contract action that does not use sealed bidding is considered a negotiated contract. Under 
FAR Part 14, sealed bidding is explained as “a method of contracting that employs 
competitive bids, public opening of bids, and awards” (FAR 14.101). As Hearn (2011) 
observed, sealed bidding should be used when 
there is a complete, detailed and realistic specification or purchase 
description; there are two or more suppliers available, willing, and able to 
compete effectively for the government’s business; selection of the 
successful bidder can be made, without discussions of the bid, on the basis 
of price or price-related factors alone; enough time is available to prepare 
a complete statement of the government’s needs; and the terms under 
which it will do business (i.e., the solicitation) and to permit bid 
submission and evaluation (Hearn, 2011, p. 61). 
Contracting by negotiations under FAR Part 15 allows the government to consider 
factors other than price to achieve best value. The contracting officer will choose one of 
these methods  on  a best value  continuum  based on the  complexity and risk of  the 
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acquisition. Lowest Price Technically Acceptable (LPTA) is utilized when the 
requirements are clearly defined, and price is the most important factor (Chang, 2013). 
The government may also consider using tradeoffs when quality and past performance 
are  more  important.  Regardless  of  the  procurement  method,  the  government  has  a 
preference for full and open competition. 
An integral part of the selection of the procurement method is this preference for 
full and open competition. The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA) directs 
government agencies to compete requirements to the maximum extent practicable (FAR 
6.101). Competition encourages innovation, unique solutions, and the best prices. The 
FAR does allow seven exceptions for the government to restrict competition if it is in the 
best interest to do so. The exceptions are only one responsible source, unusual and 
compelling urgency, industrial mobilization, international agreements, authorized or 
required by statute, interest of national security, or in the public’s best interest (10 U.S.C. 
§ 2304, 2007; 41 U.S.C. § 3304, 2012; FAR 6.302). 
b. Contract Type and Structure 
In federal procurement, pricing arrangements can be categorized into two broad 
categories: cost-reimbursement contracts where the contractor is reimbursed for all 
allowable, allocable, and reasonable costs and fixed-price contracts where the 
government pays a specific price in the execution of the requirements (Cibinic et al., 
2011). The range of contracts gives the government flexibility in meeting the mission 
while providing fair compensation to contractors for the work performed. 
FAR 16.101 outlines the several factors that must be taken into consideration 
when determining the appropriate contract type for a given procurement. The primary 
factor to consider is risk. Fixed-price contracts should be used when requirements can be 
clearly defined and costs can be easily managed. From the perspective of the government, 
fixed-price contracts are the least risky because the contractor will only be paid for the 
negotiated amount for completed and delivered work (Cibinic et al., 2011). Cost- 
reimbursement contracts are the riskiest contract type to the government because the 
government  will  ultimately pay the  contractor  for  all  allowable  costs,  regardless  of 
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whether or not the contractor’s costs exceed the negotiated estimates. The government 
prefers the use of fixed-price contracts because it is only responsible for paying a set 
price, regardless of whether or not the contractor overruns the cost estimate. Fixed-price 
contracts place the majority of the risk on the contractor. 
Depending on the type of cost-reimbursement contract, the government will also 
pay an associated fee based on a percentage of the estimated cost. Cost-plus fixed fee 
(CPFF) contracts have statutory limits on the amount of fee a contractor can receive (6 
percent for architecture and engineering, 15 percent for research and development, 10 
percent for all others) (10 U.S.C. § 2306(d), 2014; 41 U.S.C. § 3905, 2014; & FAR 
15.404). Once the target cost and fee percentage are agreed to, the fee percentage is 
incorporated as a fixed dollar amount. Incentive contracts, either cost-reimbursement or 
fixed-price, offer contractors a higher or lower percentage fee based on performance and 
delivery time (Chang, 2013). A fee adjustment formula is applied at the end of the 
contract based on the actual cost incurred that is allowable under the contract. 
In addition to contract types, the government also uses different contract 
instruments that incorporate both fixed-price and cost-type contracts. Sometimes it is 
difficult for the government to adequately estimate the exact quantities, delivery times, 
and/or period of performance. In those instances, the government utilizes indefinite 
delivery indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts or blanket purchase agreements (BPAs), 
thereby providing flexibility to meet fluctuating government demands. 
c. Proposal Evaluation Criteria 
Development of proposal evaluation criteria is a critical part of the contract 
management process. This criterion is explicitly stated in the solicitation and describes to 
the offerors what makes a proposal most advantageous to the government. FAR 15.304 
prescribes the two primary categories the government should evaluate during source 
selection: price or cost and the quality of the product or service. Furthermore, according 
to FAR 15.304(c)(3)(i), unless the contracting officer provides adequate documentation, 
past performance shall be evaluated in all procurements above the simplified acquisition 
threshold (SAT). 
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The depth of analyses will depend on the nature of the procurement; however, the 
contracting officer must determine whether the proposed price or cost is fair and 
reasonable. Cost or price is not always the most important factor when selecting the right 
contractor; however, senior DOD acquisition leaders continue to demand affordability 
from contractors and rein in the perceived out-of-control wasteful spending. The Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]), Frank 
Kendall, issued the Better Buying Power 3.0 White Paper, dated September 19, 2014. 
This third iteration of Better Buying Power continues the precedence of setting and 
enforcing affordability constraints as well as selecting the appropriate contract type for 
the procurement. One way to ensure the government meets affordability goals is to 
develop strong evaluation criteria and to select the appropriate contract type based on 
conducting thorough market research and adequate risk assessments. 
The evaluation criteria will gauge whether a proposed offer can fulfill the 
government’s requirement. As previously mentioned, the government may use any 
procurement method under the best value continuum. If the government utilizes an LPTA 
source selection method, then the contract will be awarded to the offeror whose proposal 
is the lowest priced that is deemed technically acceptable. If the government chooses to 
evaluate proposals under a tradeoff, then, according to FAR 15.10-1(a)(2), the solicitation 
must state whether “all evaluation factors other than cost or price, when combined, are 
significantly more important than, approximately equal to, or significantly less important 
than cost or price.” 
3. Solicitation 
The solicitation phase consists of formally posting the government’s requirement 
on the government point of entry (an electronic website) for industry to submit proposals 
that can satisfy the government’s needs. Prior to solicitation release, the government may 
hold a pre-solicitation conference with potential offerors to receive feedback or clarify 
draft requirements documents. The next section covers the pre-proposal conference and 
advertising requirements. 
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a. Pre-Proposal Conference 
Pre-proposal conferences (sometimes called industry days) can be a valuable 
practice to ensure all parties clearly understand the requirement and reduce problems 
during the source selection and future contract administration. Early engagement and free 
flow of information is highly encouraged under FAR 15.201 and Better Buying Power 
3.0. Offerors will often have specific questions that they do not wish to ask in front of 
their competitors; therefore, offerors should be given one-on-one time. The government 
should be careful not to violate the Procurement Integrity Act, which prohibits giving an 
offeror an unfair competitive advantage (41 U.S.C. § 423, 1994; FAR 3.104). All 
questions received from offerors should be consolidated, generalized, and shared with all 
potential offerors. 
b. Advertising Requirements 
FAR Part 5 governs the process of posting all federal contract actions. Contract 
actions valued greater than $25,000 must be advertised on the government point of entry 
(GPE) website unless an exception under FAR 5.202 exists. The GPE is where the 
government posts requests for information (RFIs), sources sought synopses, requests for 
quotes (RFQs), and requests for proposals (RFPs). Planned contract actions between 
$15,000 and $25,000 may be advertised via alternative means including phone calls, paid 
advertisements, and distributing handouts (FAR 5.101). Agencies advertise government 
requirements in order to provide a fair opportunity to potential offerors to fulfill the 
requirement and maximize competition to obtain the best solutions and pricing. 
Contracting officers are required to post notices of contract actions 15 days prior to 
execution and allow a minimum of 30 days for a response time. 
4. Source Selection 
Source selection is the formal process of selecting the right offeror’s proposal that 
can best fulfill the government’s need in accordance with the terms and conditions 
outlined in the request for proposal/solicitation. During this phase, the government will 
conduct formal communications with the offerors with the intent of understanding and 
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improving the  proposals.  The areas  covered  in  this  section  are  the  source  selection 
organization, evaluation of proposals, and formal communication with offerors. 
a. Source Selection Organization 
The source selection organization encompasses the Source Selection Authority 
(SSA), Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB), Source Selection Advisory Council 
(SSAC), and other advisors (Chang, 2013; OUSD[AT&L], 2011). The Department of 
Defense Source Selection Procedures handbook outlines the roles and responsibilities of 
the aforementioned organizations. For actions up to $100 million, the contracting officer 
is the SSA unless the agency head or designee appoints another individual. The SSA is 
responsible for protecting the integrity of the process in accordance with all of the 
applicable statutes. The SSEB is composed of individuals from different disciplines to 
evaluate proposals against the evaluation factors outlined in the RFP. The SSAC reviews 
the SSEB’s evaluation and provides a recommendation to the SSA. Non-government 
advisory and assistance contractors may serve on an SSEB; however, evaluation of an 
offeror’s past performance is an inherently governmental function and may not be 
performed by non-governmental personnel (FAR 7.5; OUSD[AT&L], 2011). The 
contracting officer is charged with ensuring the evaluation is followed in accordance with 
the RFP and all applicable statutes and regulations and acts as the overall business 
advisor throughout the process. 
b. Evaluation of Proposals 
The SSEB evaluates an offeror’s technical proposal against the evaluation criteria, 
which consists of factors and subfactors identified in the RFP. As stated in FAR 
15.305(a), “Evaluations may be conducted using any rating method or combination of 
methods including color or adjectival ratings, numerical weights, and ordinal rankings.” 
The SSEB may not rank the proposals or compare proposals against each other unless the 
SSA requests the SSEB to provide a recommendation. Furthermore, the SSEB may not 
evaluate proposals against factors and subfactors not explicitly stated in the RFP. The 
SSA has the primary responsibility of selecting the awardee based on the 
recommendation  of  the  SSAC   (if  applicable).  The   SSA  is   not   bound  by  the 
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recommendations of the SSEB or SSAC; therefore, it can choose a different offeror as 
long as the decision is documented and justifiable (Cibinic et al., 2011). 
c. Communications with Offerors 
Once proposals are received, exchanges with offerors become restricted to two 
types of communication: clarifications and discussions/negotiations. FAR 
15.306(a)(1) states that clarifications are limited exchanges with offerors when the 
government intends to award the contract without discussions. Clarifications may take 
place to help the government understand an offeror’s proposal or correct minor error 
that are clerical in nature (FAR 15.306(a)). The contractor may not revise the 
technical proposal or price under clarifications. Discussions or negotiations take place 
when there are major areas of weakness or deficiencies that must be addressed. If the 
government decides to conduct discussions with an offeror, then all offerors within 
the competitive range are entitled to discussions and may revise their proposals 
accordingly to document the negotiated changes. The competitive range is defined as 
“the range of proposals that are identified as the most highly rated, unless the range is 
reduced for purposes of efficiency” (FAR 15.306). 
5. Contract Administration 
Contract administration takes place after the award of the contract. This phase 
entails monitoring the contractor’s performance in accordance with the SOW, modifying 
the contract as necessary, and providing payment to the contractor upon delivery of the 
goods or services (Chang, 2013). 
a. Monitoring and Measuring Performance 
Once the contract has been awarded, the government must effectively monitor the 
contractor’s performance, verifying the contractor’s work results meet the cost, schedule, 
and performance criterion agreed to in the contract (Rendon & Snider, 2008). If the 
contract is for a supply item, then monitoring and measuring performance entails 
inspecting the item upon delivery and verifying it meets the contract standards for quality 
and timely delivery. Service contracts require more in-depth monitoring. This can be 
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accomplished through the use of administrative contracting officers (ACOs) and 
contracting officer representatives (CORs) to document the contractor’s performance. 
Measuring performance often requires quantifiable data to support claims about work 
performed. One such tool Earned Value Management (EVM), the practice of measuring 
actual performance over the lifetime of the contract against an integrated baseline 
(Rendon  &  Snider,  2008).  EVM  serves  as  an  early  warning  tool  that  can  prevent 
problems before it is too late. 
b. Contract Modifications 
Despite all the best efforts to clearly state the requirements, communicate with 
industry, and conduct market research, many contracts require changes after the contract 
is awarded due to differences in interpretation and shifting government missions. The 
FAR allows the contract to be modified as necessary to ensure the government’s mission 
is accomplished; however, there are limits to utilizing various changes clauses. First, the 
proposed change to the contract must be considered within the scope of the contract; 
otherwise, the requirement would need to be a new procurement. There is no official 
definition of what is “within scope” of a contract; however, scope is generally defined as 
anything that was originally contemplated at the time of the award or reasonably 
expected within the type of work (Chang, 2013). There are two types of modifications: 
unilateral, which do not require the contractor to agree to the change before performing 
the new work; and bilateral, which do require the contractor to agree to the change before 
executing the new work (FAR 43.103). In both instances, the contractor is entitled to an 
equitable adjustment. 
c. Payment and Invoices 
As Kendall’s white paper stated, “profit is the reason that the firms we rely upon, 
exist” (OUSD[AT&L], 2014, p. 4). Contractors should be paid for work performed in a 
timely manner. Some contracts only require a single payment at the end of the contract, 
while others have recurring invoices. Before a contracting officer approves the invoice, 
the officer must determine that the work was performed satisfactorily and that the costs 
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are allowable under the terms of the contract. The FAR also allows progress payments 
under fixed-price contracts for up to 80 percent of the costs incurred (FAR 32.501-1). 
6. Contract Closeout / Termination 
There are three ways a contract can end: successful completion, termination for 
convenience, or termination for default/cause (Rendon & Snider, 2008). This is the final 
phase of the contract management process. The following sections describe contract 
closeout and termination and the procedures involved. 
a. Closeout 
Contract closeout is the administrative process of ensuring the  government’s 
needs have been fulfilled in accordance with the contract and the contractor has received 
the final payment upon completion. Contract closeout procedures involve handling the 
disposition of government-furnished property, final acceptance of goods or services, final 
payment to the contractor, and documenting the contractor’s final past-performance 
report. The contract is considered physically completed when the contracting officer 
issues the contractor a written notice of complete contract termination (Rendon & Snider, 
2008; FAR 4.804-4). In accordance with agency requirements for record management 
and FAR 4.805, contract files must be retained for up to six years in case disputes arise. 
b. Terminations 
The government may unilaterally terminate any contract before completion if it is 
in the best interest to do so (FAR 2.101). Some reasons the government may terminate a 
contract for convenience are changes in the organization’s mission, budgets, or 
technology. Under a termination for convenience, the contractor receives payment for 
completed work, deliveries made, and any allowable costs incurred. Terminations for 
convenience do not negatively affect a contractor’s past performance rating. 
Terminations for default (termination for cause if it is a commercial contract) are utilized 
when a contractor is in violation of the terms and conditions and fails to correct the 
deficiencies. Terminations for default have negative impacts on future contracts where 
past performance is evaluated. The government  is not obligated to pay for work in 
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progress or work deemed unacceptable in a termination for default, but the government is 
required to pay for work in progress in a termination for convenience. 
7. Process Capability 
The contract management process is in place to ensure the government provides 
fair opportunity to businesses that wish to provide the government with supplies or 
services. According to the auditability principles, the contract management process 
should be institutionalized, monitored, and improved (Rendon & Rendon, 2015). 
According to Rendon’s Contract Management Maturity Model (CMMM), the DOD’s 
processes may not be as mature as they should be (2008). The CMMM is a “visual tool to 
help public procurement organizations assess the major steps which they must 
accomplish when procuring supplies, services, or integrated solutions” (Rendon, 2008, p. 
205). The CMMM was applied to the Air Force’s Space and Missile Center (SMC) at Los 
Angeles Air Force Base and to Navy contracting agencies and other defense agencies 
(Rendon, 2008; Rendon, 2015). Generally, based on assessments using the CMMM, 
process capability is higher for the pre-award phases of procurement planning, 
solicitation planning, solicitation, and source selection and lower for the post-award 
phases of contract administration and contract closeout (Rendon, 2015). 
If the DOD’s contract management process is not capable, the government lacks 
auditability, and therefore, becomes vulnerable to procurement fraud schemes (Rendon, 
2015). The next section covers the procurement fraud schemes that are integrated with 
the contract management process. 
D. PROCUREMENT FRAUD SCHEMES 
Instances of procurement fraud, such as the Glenn Defense Marine Asia (GDMA) 
case mentioned previously, happen far too often. The major procurement fraud categories 
common in federal contracting include the following: collusion, conflict of interest, bid- 
rigging, billing/cost/pricing schemes, fraudulent purchases, and fraudulent representation. 
GDMA utilized all of these procurement fraud categories. These categories can be 
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1. Collusion 
The DODIG defines collusion as “an agreement between two or more people to 
participate in illegal activity for profit” (DODIG, 2015). Collusion, in the present context, 
involves schemes between industry and government officials to bypass the procurement 
standards set forth by the FAR and other policies, guidance, and procedures. According 
to the General Services Administration Office of the Inspector General (GSA OIG), 
collusion can occur when competitors set minimum prices that they agree not to sell 
below a specific threshold, set prices they will charge, or reduce or eliminate discounts 
(GSA  OIG,  2012).  Collusion  reduces  competition  and  can  be  difficult  to  identify, 
especially when there are no written documents to investigate. 
Specific fraud schemes under collusion include bribery, kickbacks, and split 
purchases. The ACFE defines bribery as “offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting 
anything of value to influence an official act or business decision” (Feldman, 2015, p. 7). 
The FAR defines a kickback as “any money, fee, commission, credit, gift, gratuity, thing 
of value, or compensation of any kind which is provided to any prime 
contractor/subcontractor employee for the purpose of improperly obtaining or rewarding 
favorable treatment in connection with a prime contract” (FAR 3.502-1). In the GDMA, 
the Navy accused Francis of offering Navy procurement officials and other military 
personnel large sums of money, concert tickets, luxury travel, and prostitutes in exchange 
for information on specific ship schedules and to reward Navy officials for awarding the 
contract to GDMA (Adams, 2015). Details continue to emerge regarding the case. Vona 
(2011) delineated bribery from kickbacks. According to Vona (2011), bribery is 
considered  affecting  a  person’s  judgment,  whereas  a  kickback  seeks  to  affect  the 
management of a process. 
According to FAR 13.003(c)(2), splitting purchases are accomplished by 
separating the acquisition of requirements so the cost of each action is below a specific 
dollar threshold. Split purchases under collusion usually involve scheming to avoid 
specific dollar thresholds and circumvent the contract management process that would 
drive additional requirements for competition, oversight, or justification. 
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2. Conflict of Interest 
In federal procurement, there are two kinds of conflict of interest, organizational 
and personal. According to the FAR, an organizational conflict of interest occurs when “a 
person is unable or potentially unable to render impartial assistance or advice to the 
Government or the persons’ objectivity in performing the contract work is or might be 
otherwise impaired or a person has an unfair competitive advantage” (FAR 2.101). A 
firm may have an organizational conflict of interest if there is an employee working on 
the government team to develop a requirement upon which that firm intends to bid. That 
firm may be seen as having a competitive advantage. A personal conflict of interest 
occurs when an employee of a particular organization has “an undisclosed legal 
ownership or beneficial interest in a related entity” (Vona, 2011, p. 37). Personal 
conflicts of interest can be difficult to detect because investigators rely on individuals to 
provide truthful statements. Government acquisition professionals are required to 
complete the Office of Government Ethics (OGE) Form 450 and disclose pertinent 
financial  information  including  stocks,  loans,  other  sources  of  income,  and  outside 
employment about themselves or close relatives. 
Conflict of interest schemes may arise during the source selection phase of the 
contract management process. For example, a government engineer working on a program 
was selected to serve on the source selection evaluation board. The engineer has a 
significant financial interest in the form of investments in one of the companies that is 
competing for the award of a contract. In this case, the engineer has a personal conflict of 
interest and may not may participate in the source selection because his decision ability 
may be influenced by his financial ties to the company (Office of Government Ethics, n.d.). 
3. Bid Rigging 
Bid rigging is similar to collusion in that it involves an agreement with a deceitful 
intent and can take on many forms (Federal Trade Commission, n.d.). Bid rigging is 
commonly seen between organizations, end users, or procurement officials and used to 
undermine and corrupt the competitive procurement process. These parties conspire amongst 
themselves to determine which organization will submit the best proposal to be ultimately 
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chosen by the government (Vona, 2011). Government requirements owners can rig the 
process by tailoring SOWs so a specific offeror receives the contract, creating false 
requirements, or by separating the requirement into multiple actions to stay under 
procurement thresholds and avoid FAR competition requirements. Instances of procuring 
officials rigging the process include biased evaluation of a vendor proposal, deliberately 
leaking proprietary or source selection sensitive information to preferred suppliers, or 
restricting competition artificially (e.g., sole-source award instead of full and open 
competition) (Chang, 2013). Corruption from the offerors involves an agreement on who will 
be the winning bidder: “The [purchasing office], which depends on competition between the 
bidders to generate the lowest competitive price, receives instead a ‘lowest bid’ that is higher 
than the competitive market would bear” (Department of Justice, n.d., p. 2). 
4. Billing / Cost / Pricing Schemes 
Billing/cost/pricing fraud schemes encompass a range of activity, but the overall 
theme is willful distortion of financial data. The FAR Part 31 outlines contract cost 
principles and procedures and states that costs must be allowable, allocable, and 
reasonable (FAR 31.201-2–4). Cost mischarging is a violation of the allowable and 
allocable rules that involve charging costs not related to the execution of a particular 
contract. For a cost to be allocable, it must be traceable to the performance of that 
particular contract or otherwise be included in the overhead costs. Some indicators of 
mischarging costs include the following: costs billed under time and materials (T&M) 
contracts greatly exceed estimates; proposed costs do not appear to be directly related to 
the contract under which they are submitted; material quantities are exorbitantly higher 
than contract requirements; and labor time and charges seem inconsistent with project 
progress (GSA OIG, 2012). Under the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA), contractors are 
required to submit and certify that all costs are current, accurate, and complete to the best 
of their knowledge (FAR 15.406-2). Defective pricing occurs when it is discovered that 
the cost or pricing data submitted were inaccurate, incomplete, or noncurrent. If the 
contractor knowingly submitted the defective pricing, the government is entitled to an 
amount equal to any over-payment. 
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Karpoff,  Lee,  and  Vendrzyk’s  (1999)  study,  “Defense  Procurement  Fraud, 
Penalties, and Contractor Influence” noted that 
even though contracts typically specify prices, contract prices commonly 
are subjected to a process of almost continual renegotiation and revision. It 
is the perception that contractors can extract abnormal profits at this stage 
of the process that  motivates  many  of  the  DOD’s  procurement  rules 
(p. 811). 
This is an example of how change order abuse can occur. Change order abuse occurs 
when a contractor colludes with a procurement official and submits a proposal at a low 
price to win the contract with the intent to drive the price back up once the contract is 
awarded through the submission of requests for equitable adjustments (REAs) (DODIG, 
n.d.). Another fraudulent practice within billing/cost/pricing schemes is fictitious or sham 
transactions (Vona, 2011). This scheme can involve the contractor, government 
personnel, or both working together. By submitting false invoices, the contractor is 
overpaid. The government buyer who approved the invoice could be in on the scheme 
and receive a kickback. 
5. Fraudulent Purchases 
Fraudulent purchases involve acquiring material in excess of government 
requirements (Chang, 2013). This can involve government employees using a 
government purchase card for personal usage or purchasing items that are within the 
scope of their job, but selling the items for personal benefit. Employees accomplish this 
by falsifying purchase documentation to appear legitimate (Vona, 2011). Fraudulent 
purchases can also involve collusion between contractors and government customers 
conspiring to purchase quantities above the contract requirements. 
6. Fraudulent Representation 
Fraudulent Representation involves deceiving the government by the distortion of 
goods and services that fail to meet quality standards demanded by the contract. As stated 
in 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1996), False Statements, it is illegal to 
(1) Knowingly falsify, conceal, or cover up a material fact by any trick, 
scheme, or device 
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(2) Make false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements or representations 
(3) Make or use any false document or writing within the jurisdiction of 
any department or agency of the U.S. 
Examples of this type of fraud scheme include a contractor providing low-grade materials 
for a radar tower that fails to withstand minimum wind gusts specified in the contract or 
using low quality replacement parts that continue to break. Similarly, “product 
substitution” is when a contractor provides a product other than what is specified in the 
contract and fails to inform the government of the substitution (DODIG, n.d.). The next 
section  discusses  the  third  component  of  the  auditability  triangle,  which  is  having 
competent people. 
E. COMPETENT PEOPLE 
The   DOD 
professionals.   For 
professionals  have 
assigns   specific   personnel classification   codes   to acquisition 
the   DOD,   having   competent   people   means   acquisition-coded 
the  right  education,  training,  and  experience  requirements  in 
accordance  with  the  Defense  Acquisition  Workforce  Improvement  Act  (DAWIA) 
requirements. DAWIA applies to DOD personnel in the following career fields: auditing, 
cost-estimating,  contracting,  financial  management,  engineering,  life-cycle  logistics, 
industrial/contract property management, information technology, purchasing, 
production/quality/manufacturing, program management, facilities engineering, science 
and technology management, and test and evaluation (DAU, 2015; Rendon & Snider, 
2008). DOD personnel in those billets are required to earn and maintain certifications in 
those areas through a combination of in-residence and online training courses, as well as 
on-the-job experience related to the specific certification. This training is provided 
mainly through the Defense Acquisition University (DAU). In order to maintain a level 
of certification from DAU, personnel must earn 80 hours of continuous learning points 
every two years (DAU, 2015). 
Part of having competent people in procurement includes being knowledgeable 
not just in specific functional areas, but also in procurement fraud schemes. Recent 
research on the contracting workforce shows that contracting officers may not have 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 27 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
sufficient knowledge on procurement fraud schemes. Chang’s (2013) research found that 
contracting personnel at the Army’s MICC were not as knowledgeable of procurement 
fraud schemes despite having rated themselves as very knowledgeable. Castillo and 
Flanigan (2014) conducted similar research that yielded similar results among contracting 
personnel at the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center. Other professionals involved in 
procurement, such as the customer defining a government requirement, might not 
specifically be acquisition-coded; therefore, they do not fall under DAWIA standards for 
training. However, these professionals should be trained in the contract management 
process. Additionally, personnel responsible for investigating contract fraud should be 
trained to identify the various fraud schemes that can occur throughout the contract 
management process. In order to identify contract fraud, investigators must be familiar 
with the contract management process. The purpose of this research is to assess AFOSI’s 
procurement fraud agents’ knowledge of the contract management process and 
procurement fraud schemes, as well as to evaluate their perception of knowledge in these 
areas. 
Many contractors have exploited the DOD’s fraud vulnerability and government 
personnel who have chosen to take advantage of weaknesses in the system. Ineffective 
internal controls, less than capable contracting processes, and less than competent people 
have contributed to the fraud, waste, and abuse. When these instances occur, the 
government must respond by aggressively investigating such allegations and prosecuting 
those responsible for the fraudulent activities. In the Air Force, this burden falls upon 
AFOSI as the primary investigating agency for allegations of procurement fraud (AFOSI 
Public Affairs Office, 2011). In fact, AFOSI was founded as a result of a procurement 
fraud investigation and charged with the mission to “identify, exploit and neutralize 
criminal, terrorist and intelligence threats to the Air Force, Department of Defense and 
U.S. Government” (AFOSI Public Affairs Office, 2011; Hagerty, 2008, pp. 10–11). 
F. SUMMARY 
This  chapter  presented  a  brief  synopsis  of  the  DOD  procurement  fraud 
environment, which included a general discussion of the auditability triangle. A detailed 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 28 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
description of the contract management process was also presented as well as the major 
procurement fraud schemes that are common in federal contracting. Finally, this chapter 
discussed the “competent people” component of the auditability triangle, which is the 
focus of this research. The present research assesses AFOSI investigators’ knowledge of 
the contract management process. In the following chapter, Chapter III, a description of 
AFOSI and its capabilities build the necessary foundation for this research. 
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III. AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a background of the Air Force Office of Special 
Investigations (AFOSI). An overview of the Air Force and how Air Force Acquisition 
supports the bigger Air Force mission is discussed. The propensity for fraud to occur 
throughout the acquisition life cycle is also identified. This chapter provides a detailed 
look at AFOSI and the organization’s history, mission, organizational structure, and focus 
as a Military Criminal Investigation Organization (MCIO) within the Air Force. 
Additionally, this research examines the training requirements associated with the 
contract  management  process  for  AFOSI  agents  specializing  in  the  investigation  of 
procurement fraud. 
B. AIR FORCE OVERVIEW 
Since its establishment in 1947, the Air Force has been a separate military service 
with distinct roles and missions in support of “airpower” (U.S. Air Force, 2013). 
Although the original mission of the Air Force was primarily for preserving the security 
of the skies after World War II, the mission has since expanded in scope. Today, the Air 
Force must maintain a force capable of executing full-spectrum military operations 
(Department of the Air Force (DAF) (2014). The Air Force accomplishes this through 
“five core missions: 1) air and space superiority; 2) intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR); 3) rapid global mobility; 4) global strike; and 5) command and 
control (C2)” (DAF, 2014, p. 4; DAF, 2015, p. 6). These missions allow the Air Force to 
maintain “Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power” (DAF, 2015, p. 6) 
throughout the domains of air, space, or cyberspace. Such a dynamic mission requires 
state-of-the-art technology as well as superior logistical support to maintain a competitive 
edge over adversaries regardless of the operating environment. These five core missions 
also guide how the Air Force invests its resources (DAF, 2014). 
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1. Air Force Budget 
Maintaining this standard of dominance is challenging and forces the Air Force to 
continually invest in an array of new technology through research, development, test, & 
evaluation (RDT&E) programs. At the same time, the Air Force must also procure 
supplies and services necessary to support existing systems, equipment, and personnel. 
Most of the funds expended for acquisitions supporting these requirements are performed 
through the use of contracts between the Air Force and private industry. According to the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) (2014), in fiscal year (FY) 2015, the federal 
government budgeted $495.6 billion for the Department of Defense (DOD). The majority 
of this funding was to provide for day-to-day operations such as military pay and 
healthcare benefits. One-third, or approximately $159.3 billion, was for the procurement 
of future defense needs (DOD, 2014). Table 1 shows how the FY2015 DOD budget was 
divided among the military departments, while Figure 1 shows a visual depiction of the 
distribution. 
Table 1. DOD Base Budget by Military Department in FY2015 
Numbers may not add due to rounding. Adapted from Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense Comptroller (OUSD[C]). (2014). United States Department of Defense fiscal 
year  2015  budget  request,  p.  115.  Retrieved  from  http://comptroller.defense.gov 
/Portals/45/documents/defbudget/fy2015/fy2015_budget_request_overview_book.pdf 
 
Base Budget FY2015 
Army $120.3B 
Navy/Marine Corps $147.7B 
Air Force $137.8B 
Defense Wide Account $89.8B 
Total $495.6B 
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Figure 1. DOD Budget by Military Department in FY2015 
Adapted from OUSD[C]. (2014). United States Department of Defense fiscal year 2015 
budget   request,   p.   115.   Retrieved   from   http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45 
/documents/defbudget/fy2015/fy2015_budget_request_overview_book.pdf 
The Air Force’s FY2015 budget of $137.8 billion was allocated in accordance with 
its core missions to the specific appropriations to the following areas: military personnel, 
operations and maintenance (O&M), procurement, RDT&E, military construction 
(MILCON), military family housing (MFH), and base realignment and closure (BRAC) 
(Secretary of the Air Force for Financial Management [SAF/FM], 2014). Funds that were 
allocated from the Air Force budget were categorized as “blue,” while funds that were 
controlled by agencies other than the Air Force were “non-blue,” and the combination of 
these two sources made up the total Air Force FY2015 budget (SAF/FM, 2014). 
a. Military Personnel 
Approximately $29.1 billion was appropriated to support the total force, made up 
of active duty personnel, reservists, and Air National Guardsmen (SAF/FM, 2014). This 
funding was used to provide military pay and allowances, training, recruiting efforts, 
permanent change of station, and other forms of military compensation. An additional 
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b. Operation and Maintenance 
Approximately $44.3 billion was used to execute daily operations at 79 military 
Air Force installations around the world (SAF/FM 2014). O&M funds enable active, 
reserve, and National Guard Air Force units worldwide to maintain a constant state of 
readiness through flying operations, maintenance and support activities, equipment, and 
supplies for the warfighter, ISR, civilian personnel pay, sustainment, space operations, 
etc.  An  additional  $869  million  in  non-blue  funds  was  also  appropriated  for  O&M 
(SAF/FM 2014). 
c. Procurement 
In FY2015, the Air Force allocated $18.5 billion for procurement. Funds 
appropriated for procurement enable the Air Force to obtain and maintain its inventory of 
aircraft, missiles, ammunition, weapons, and other combat systems (SAF/FM, 2014). 
These funds also allow the Air Force the ability to maintain the military advantage of air 
and space supremacy by acquiring the next generation of defense system technology. In 
addition to the funds allocated from the Air Force’s budget, an additional $14.9 billion 
was allocated for procurement from non-blue sources (SAF/FM, 2014). 
d. Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation 
As the adversaries of the United States attempt to identify and exploit system 
weaknesses, the military must respond by closing the gaps and further advancing 
technology. This is done through RDT&E, where funds are used to research, develop, 
test, and evaluate next-generation capabilities for the Air Force of tomorrow. In an 
attempt to continue developing new technology, the Air Force appropriated $15.9 billion 
in FY2015 to RDT&E, which provides for basic and applied scientific research, advanced 
technology development, testing, and the required support for such programs (SAF/FM, 
2014). According to the Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation, DOD 
7000.14-R, Volume 2B, Chapter 5, basic research is a general study into an area in order 
to gain a general understanding of the area (2012). At the basic research level, there is no 
application of the research. Conversely, in applied research, researchers are aiming to 
apply previously ascertained knowledge to develop new technology and solve a particular  
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need (OUSD[C], 2012). “Advanced technology development” is where researchers 
attempt to integrate several areas of knowledge together in order to develop a system that 
can be tested for future use in the field (OUSD[C], 2012). An additional $7.8 billion in 
non-blue funds was also appropriated for RDT&E (SAF/FM, 2014). 
e. Military Construction 
As the Air Force approaches 68 years as the air arm of the military, it must also 
repair and update an aging infrastructure as well as construct new facilities to store 
existing and new technology. This is executed through MILCON appropriations, and in 
FY2015, the Air Force dedicated $956 million to update and construct facilities and 
infrastructure for the force (SAF/FM, 2014). 
f. Military Family Housing 
In  FY2015,  the  Air  Force  appropriated  $328  million  to  the  maintenance  of 
existing military family housing. In addition, these funds were used for the design and 
construction of new housing units for personnel (SAF/FM, 2014). 
g. Base Realignment and Closure 
As Air Force installations become outdated and the size of the budget and force 
shrink, the Air Force must also consolidate and close installations that are no longer seen 
as suitable for military operations. Accordingly, the Air Force must transfer equipment 
and take other appropriate steps to vacate these areas. In FY2015, the Air Force allocated 
$91 million for BRAC (SAF/FM, 2014). 
In order to ensure the successful execution of its mission, the Air Force 
appropriated $109.2 billion in blue funds and an additional $28.6 billion in non-blue 
funds. In total, the Air Force allocated all of its $137.8 billion across these strategic 
priorities  (SAF/FM,  2014).  Table  2  provides  a  consolidated  snapshot  of  Air  Force 
appropriations for FY2015 from both blue and non-blue funds. 
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Table 2. Air Force Total Obligation Authority (TOA) for FY2015 
Numbers may not add due to rounding. Adapted from Secretary of the Air Force for 
Financial Management (SAF/FM). (2014). U.S. Air Force FY 2015 budget overview, 
p. 11. Retrieved from http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-140304- 
039.pdf 
2. Air Force Procurement 
In order to obtain the supplies and services necessary to execute their missions, 
requirements managers or end users turn to contracting officers. Other than the majority 
of the appropriations made for MILPERS, many of the Air Force requirements are 
obtained, at some level, through government contracts. With such a significant 
responsibility, contracting officers must take great care to comply with statutes and 
public policy. In addition, they must ensure contracts are accurate, complete, obtain a fair 
and reasonable price, and reduce the risk as much as possible to both the buyer and the 
seller. 
To perform this task, contracting officers are governed through the contract 
management process by many different sources. Chief among these sources are mandates 
from  federal  statutes  that  may  convolute  the  contract  management  process.  These 
legislative policies includes the following: 
 
Appropriation FY 15 Budget* 
Military Personnel (MILPERS) $29.1B 
Operation and Maintenance (O&M) $44.3B 
Procurement $18.5B 
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) $16B 
Military Construction (MILCON) $956M 
Military Family Housing (MFH) $328M 
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) $91M 
Non-Blue TOA $28.6B 
Total Obligation Authority (TOA) 137.8B 
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 Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) 


Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) 
 
Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) 
 Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) 


Truth in Negotiation Act (TINA) 
 
Small Business Act (SBA) 






In addition to congressional acts, the FAR is made up of 53 parts containing more 
than 2,000 pages of regulatory language in the form of definitions, clauses, and policy, all 
of which may be subject to conflicting interpretations. Air Force contracting officers 
must abide by further regulations, including the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(DFAR) and the Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation (AFFAR). Finally, Air Force 
contracting officers operating in certain commands have command-specific guidance and 
policy in the form of the Air Force Material Command (AFMC) Mandatory 
Procedures/Informational Guidance and the Air Force Installation Contracting Agency 
(AFICA) Mandatory Procedures. While this list is not exhaustive, it does paint a small 
picture of the burden associated with government contracting. 
The aforementioned acts and policies were intended to improve the acquisition 
process. Instead, many of these reforms have proven to be counterproductive and made it 
increasingly difficult to manage and oversee contracts effectively (as cited in Yoder, 
2007). Making things more difficult is the reduction of personnel and the ensuing 
dwindling level of experience in the acquisition workforce (Yoder, 2007). Many 
government contracts are for developmental items, and these contracts are written with 
ambiguous requirements in order to give contractors flexibility and encourage innovation 
(Brown,  Potoski,  &  Van  Slyke,  2013).  However,  conflicting  objectives  between 
government  and  private  industry  produce  an  environment  where  the  contractor  can 
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behave defectively and take advantage of the government. Defective behavior is where 
one party within a contract acts for its own self-interest at the expense of the other party 
(Brown et al., 2013). The government, expecting a cooperative and trustworthy 
relationship with the contractor, is left exposed and extremely vulnerable to procurement 
fraud (Brown et al., 2013). 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) identified several challenges to 
effective contract management in the DOD (GAO, 2015). Although considerable 
improvements have been made with regard to the use of appropriate contracting methods, 
the GAO (2015) identified several inefficiencies within the areas of acquisition 
workforce, contracting techniques and approaches, service acquisitions, and operational 
contract support. 
Specifically, the GAO (2015) found that the acquisition workforce and its 
leadership lacked proper training, experience, and capacity. The GAO also identified the 
lack of a proper strategy for executing service acquisitions and that acquisition personnel 
responsible for making decisions in this area were doing so without reliable data (GAO, 
2015). The GAO also found insufficient policies for effective contingency contract 
management and that contracting agencies lacked the necessary personnel and resources 
to manage the volume of requirements. While considerable improvements have been 
made in recent years, it should be noted that these areas have been assessed as being 
high-risk since 1992 (GAO, 2015). 
With such large amounts of funds being spent to procure supplies and services 
and the generally cumbersome nature associated with government contracting, 
government procurement is highly vulnerable to procurement fraud (HQ AFOSI/XRG, 
2009). Procurement fraud within the Air Force or DOD is not a new problem and, while 
ensuring compliance to policies and regulations may assist with fraud prevention and 
increase transparency, these solutions alone do not prevent procurement fraud. Instead, 
fraudulent activity must be identified as early in the contract management process as 
possible, investigated effectively and efficiently, and prosecuted. It is for these reasons, 
that  in  1948,  the  Air  Force  activated  AFOSI  and  chartered  it  with  the  mission  of 
investigating allegations of procurement fraud (Hagerty 2008, p. 26). 
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C. AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS 
At the conclusion of World War II, the use of aircraft proved to be essential to the 
future defense strategy of the United States. It quickly became apparent that the 
capability for air operations would need to expand. With the enactment of the National 
Security Act of 1947, the Army Air Force was deactivated and the Air Force was 
established as a separate and independent service (DAF, 2013). As the Air Force 
expanded with increased personnel and resources, it soon found itself in the wake of a 
corruption scandal involving an Air Force major general (Hagerty, 2008, pp. 7–8). 
1. Background of AFOSI 
According to an anonymous letter in 1945, Major General Bennet Meyers 
reviewed bids from contractors seeking government contracts and used knowledge from 
his position to purchase stock in companies that he knew would win a contract (Hagerty 
2008, p. 3). Since the letter was anonymous, no further action was taken until several 
years later; however, General Meyers’ professional conduct had come up during a Senate 
investigative committee, and when the committee requested Meyers’ records, there were 
indications of a cover-up due to Meyers’ rank and standing (Hagerty, 2008, pp. 5–7; 
Kunze, n.d.). The ensuing investigation disclosed several issues with the investigative 
arm of the Air Force. 
At the time of the Meyers investigation, air inspectors were organized under the 
regular Air Force chain of command, so they were hesitant in their investigation of 
Meyers, fearing possible repercussions. This chain of command created a potential for 
undue command influence as senior leaders had the ability to restrict investigators’ 
activity and deny access to relevant information (Hagerty, 2008, pp. 11–12). In addition, 
inspectors were bound by regulations to inform witnesses about the details and evidence 
of an ongoing investigation. This lack of secrecy impaired the investigators’ ability to 
collect evidence, as the disclosure of sensitive case information could get back to a 
suspect, allowing the suspect to “cover up” criminal activity (Hagerty 2008, p. 12). 
Despite  these  issues,  through  the  course  of  Senate  hearings,  enough  evidence  was 
obtained to enable prosecutors to convict Meyers on war profiteering charges, his role in 
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a contract scheme with ghost companies that he owned, and witness tampering (Hagerty, 
2008, pp. 8–9). 
In the aftermath of this high-profile investigation, it was evident that there were 
issues within the investigative body of the Air Force. For example, although operating in 
a law enforcement and investigative capacity, inspectors lacked the necessary authority to 
actually enforce laws (Hagerty, 2008, pp. 11–12). In response, the Senate committee 
recommended that all military investigative organizations be restructured with proper 
rules  and  authority  comparable  to  external  agencies  such  as  the  Federal  Bureau  of 
Investigation (FBI) (Kunze, n.d.). 
a. Activation 
The Air Force was the first to respond to the Senate committee’s 
recommendation, and then–Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington coordinated with 
J. Edgar Hoover, FBI director, to assist in the transition (Hagerty 2008, p. 13). In 1948, 
under Hoover’s direction and Symington’s authority, FBI Special Agent Joseph Carroll 
was commissioned as a brigadier general (Brig Gen) in the Air Force. On August 1, 1948, 
AFOSI was formerly activated as the new investigative agency of the Air Force (Hagerty 
2008, p. 27). AFOSI was also given the necessary authority to operate as an independent 
chain of command with Brig Gen Carroll as the first commander under the Office of the 
Inspector General (Hagerty, 2008, pp. 14, 19). In the coming years, AFOSI units were 
established at several Air Force bases throughout the world with the mission of 
investigating criminal, fraud, and counterintelligence matters in order to protect the Air 
Force’s personnel, equipment, supplies, and funds (Kunze, n.d.). 
b. Mission 
Today, AFOSI serves as the sole federal law enforcement and investigative 
agency in the Air Force, with more than 2,300 federally credentialed special agents 
positioned around the world (AFOSI Public Affairs Office, 2011). AFOSI’s mission is 
“to identify, exploit and neutralize criminal, terrorist and intelligence threats to the Air 
Force, Department of Defense and U.S. Government” (AFOSI Public Affairs Office, 
2011). In this capacity, AFOSI conducts full spectrum operations in criminal, fraud, and  
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counterintelligence matters. As the operational environment evolved, AFOSI expanded 
its mission to include forensics, polygraph, technical services, cyber, protective services, 
and counterterrorism (AFOSI Public Affairs Office, 2011). 
In order to achieve its mission, AFOSI instituted core capabilities (see Figure 2) 
that are essential and expected of all agents. These capabilities support the overarching 
AFOSI strategy to “build an environment of excellence at all levels, all the time; elevate 
professional stature of AFOSI in the Department of Defense, United States and 
international arenas; and be a requirements-driven organization and build capabilities in- 
depth” (AFOSI Public Affairs Office, 2011). Although AFOSI special agents have 
jurisdiction and responsibility to investigate all major crimes within the Air Force, this 
research focuses primarily on the procurement fraud mission, the AFOSI Procurement 
Fraud Unit (PFU), and the agents assigned to the PFU. 
Figure 2. AFOSI Core Capabilities 
Adapted from Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) Public Affairs Office. 
(2011).   Inside   AFOSI   [Fact   sheet].   Retrieved   from   http://www.osi.af.mil/library 
/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=4848 
2. AFOSI Office of Procurement Fraud 
Throughout the years, AFOSI maintained its concentration on its primary mission 
areas of investigating procurement fraud, counterintelligence matters, and general crimes. 
During the 1970s, AFOSI changed its investigative focus to place more emphasis on 
investigating counterintelligence and general crimes (Hagerty, 2008, p. 303). As a result 
of these changes, procurement fraud billets were eventually reduced from 127 agents to 
71. Following a series of major high-level fraud cases, Congress passed the Inspector 
General (IG) Act of 1978. The Inspector General (IG) Act of 1978 proved that the 
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president and Congress were committed to the reduction of fraud, waste, and abuse in the 
federal government. This attention had trickle-down effects and revitalized the AFOSI 
Procurement Fraud program (Hagerty, 2008, p. 303). 
After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, AFOSI focused on 
counterterrorism and counterintelligence operations, which required agents to train and 
deploy in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. As a 
result, investigating procurement fraud became less of a priority (C. King, personal 
communication, July 1, 2015). Today, AFOSI is once again placing more attention on 
procurement fraud. This was evident with the October 2013 activation of the AFOSI 
Office of Procurement Fraud (OPF), which was given the mission of investigating 
allegations of procurement fraud originating from strategic or centralized acquisitions 
(Essex & Gaffney, 2014; Kidwell, 2013). 
The new AFOSI OPF received 83 manning billets that would be specifically 
assigned to investigating procurement fraud (C. King, personal communication, July 1, 
2015). With approximately 200 Air Force bases, and the high volume of contracts 
awarded by Air Force contracting officers, the main challenge to investigating fraud is 
having the necessary manpower to proactively seek out fraud early on while also 
investigating current and reported allegations (C. King, personal communication, July 1, 
2015). Figure 3 provides a graphical depiction of Air Force bases located within the 
continental United States. 
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Figure 3. Map of United States Air Force Base Locations 
This map shows the locations of Air Force bases throughout the United States. The colors 
on this map do not correspond to the colors on the map in Figure 4 nor do they represent 
any specific areas of responsibility. Adapted from Defense  Media Activity.  (2010). 
Airman,  the  book  2010,  volume  LIV(3),  p.  53.  Retrieved  from  http://www.af.mil 
/Portals/1/documents/airman_archive/2010%20The%20Book.pdf 
Although the size of the new OPF was considerably smaller than the 1970s’ high 
of 127 agents, the new office took a lean and strategic approach with its organizational 
structure and allocation of agents (C. King, personal communication, July 1, 2015). 
Accordingly, agents were assigned to one of 22 operating locations throughout the United 
States under six Procurement Fraud Units (PFUs). To ensure adequate coverage, these 
PFUs were intentionally aligned with major contracting hubs for the Air Force (C. King, 
personal communication, July 1, 2015). Figure 4 shows the locations of AFOSI PFU 
Operating Locations (OLs). 
Organizationally, the OPF became somewhat of a separate organization within 
AFOSI, led by a director who was a subject matter expert in investigating fraud (C. King, 
personal  communication,  July 1,  2015).  This  allowed  AFOSI  as  an  organization  to 
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continue to exploit other mission areas while at the same time focusing on fraud. 
Additionally, the strategic approach to implementing OPF prevented agents the 
requirement  to  investigate  all  allegations  of  other  criminal  offenses.  Instead,  agents 
focused solely on procurement fraud (C. King, personal communication, July 1, 2015). 
Figure 4. AFOSI Office of Procurement Fraud Areas of Responsibility Chart 
The colors on this map represent Air Force Office of Special Investigations Office of 
Procurement Fraud’s areas of responsibility and do not correspond to the colors on the 
map in Figure 3. Adapted from C. King, personal communication, July 1, 2015. This 
AFOSI Procurement Fraud Area of Responsibility Chart was presented during a 
discussion at HQ AFOSI/XRG, Quantico, VA 
All AFOSI special agents receive a basic level of training on the contract 
management process, major procurement fraud schemes, and investigation of allegations 
of fraud. This ensures any agent can be assigned to OPF (C. King, personal 
communication, July 1, 2015). However, in order to ensure PFUs were manned with 
agents familiar with the complexity of investigating procurement fraud, OPF leadership 
ensured advanced fraud training opportunities were available (C. King, personal 
communication, July 1, 2015). There is no requirement for any specific training once an 
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agent is assigned to a PFU, but advanced training is offered and highly encouraged by 
AFOSI leadership (C. King, personal communication, July 1, 2015) 
3. AFOSI Training 
Training for all AFOSI agents begins at the Federal Law Enforcement Training 
Center (FLETC) in Glynco, GA. When initially hired to AFOSI, agents attend a federal 
Criminal Investigators Training Program (CITP) followed by an AFOSI-specific training, 
Basic Special Investigations Course (BSIC), to familiarize agents with investigations 
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) as well as other pertinent federal 
laws (AFOSI Public Affairs Office, 2011; C. Collins, personal communication, June 29, 
2015). Upon graduating from both courses, agents enter a one-year probationary training 
program known as the Basic Extension Program (BEP), which is an on-the-job-type 
training program where agents get real-world investigative experience in different areas 
(C. Collins, personal communication, June 29, 2015). This training is required regardless 
of the investigative position of an agent, but there is also advanced training available for 
those  agents  that  specialize  in  a  specific  focus  area,  such  as  procurement  fraud 
(C. Collins, personal communication, June 29, 2015). 
a. Criminal Investigations Training Program 
CITP is an eleven-and-a-half-week federal law enforcement training program 
where students learn the basics of federal law enforcement (AFOSI Public Affairs Office, 
2011). Since this training is a basic course, newly hired agents from many different federal 
law enforcement agencies attend for an introduction to federal law enforcement. This 
course provides students the foundation to run investigations, conduct interviews and 
surveillance, collect evidence, and testify in court (FLETC, 2015a). Additionally, CITP 
introduces students to federal statutes, which will serve as the basis for future investigations 
(FLETC Office of Chief Counsel, 2015). The federal statutes contain “elements” of crimes. 
These elements are the minimum level of proof that is required to convict an alleged 
criminal in court (FLETC Office of Chief Counsel, 2015). Accordingly, it is important for 
an investigator to understand these elements in order to conduct and develop a complete 
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investigation.  These  common  skills  learned  in  FLETC  are  used  to  investigate  many 
different types of illegal activity, especially procurement fraud. 
b. Basic Special Investigators Course 
Upon graduating from CITP, agents immediately enter BSIC, where they receive 
AFOSI-specific lectures and scenario-based instruction at the U.S. Air Force Special 
Investigations Academy (USAFSIA) in Glynco, GA (AFOSI Public Affairs Office, 
2007). BSIC serves as an introduction to AFOSI as an organization and introduces new 
agents to investigating criminal offenses under the U.S. Code and the UCMJ. BSIC also 
introduces some challenges specific to investigating offenses within the Air Force (C. 
Collins, personal communication, June 29, 2015). Training topics include interrogations, 
report writing, crimes against property, crimes against persons, counterintelligence, force 
protection,  and  economic  crimes  (AFOSI  Public  Affairs  Office,  2007).  During  the 
economic crimes block of instruction, new agents are trained on the complexities of the 
contract management process and procurement fraud (C. Collins, personal 
communication, June 29, 2015). 
AFOSI has defined fraud as “a willful misrepresentation for the purpose of 
obtaining something of value” (HQ AFOSI/XRG, 2015, p. 22), and this is where 
instruction on investigating procurement fraud begins (USAFSIA, 2015b). From here, 
USAFSIA  (2015b)  instructs  students  on  the  execution  of  the  AFOSI  fraud  mission 
through three steps: 
1. Assess the environment to identify targets and determine priorities of these 
targets through the value of a resource, the impact of its mission, or the 
potential for loss 
Proactively detect and investigate fraud within the previously identified 
targets 
Seek remedies for instances of fraud through prosecutorial or 
administrative authorities (USAFSIA, 2015b) 
2. 
3. 
This basic introduction sets the stage for the remainder of the economic crimes lectures 
for new AFOSI special agents. 
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Although not all AFOSI agents will be assigned to procurement fraud units, there 
is a potential for any agent to be called upon to investigate or assist with a fraud 
investigation at either the base, strategic, or central/systems level of procurement (C. 
Collins, personal communication, June 29, 2015). Accordingly, USAFSIA ensures all 
agents have a general understanding of the contract management process as documented 
in  the  Defense  Acquisition  Guidebook  and  the  FAR  (USAFSIA,  2014c).  Instructors 
attempt to do this by introducing agents to the acquisition life cycle, depicted in Figure 5. 
Figure 5. Government Acquisition Life-Cycle 
U.S.  Air  Force  Special Investigations  Academy  (USAFSIA).  (2014c). Procurement 
process overview [BSIC economic crimes lecture], p. 5. Glynco, GA: AFOSI 
Throughout the course of instruction, students learn what drives requirements for 
end users and how the type of requirement can influence where it enters in the acquisition 
life cycle (USAFSIA, 2014c). As instruction moves on, students learn what constitutes a 
legal contract as well as types of contracts and when they are used. In addition, students 
learn how to navigate through a contract file in order to conduct a review (C. Collins, 
personal communication, June 29, 2015). 
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Once agents understand the basics of the contract management process, they focus 
on procurement fraud schemes and the applicable laws that are commonly violated 
through the schemes. This is a significant point of the instruction because it is important 
for agents to understand that the allegation or even presence of a fraud scheme does not 
actually constitute illegal activity until a violation of the law has occurred (USAFSIA, 
2014a). For example, the intent of a contractor to willingly substitute substandard 
products on a government contract is not by itself a violation of the law. However, once 
the contractor certifies the products meet all specifications and submits the claim for 
payment, that person has committed a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, False Statements, 
and 18 U.S.C. § 287, False Claims (USAFSIA, 2014a). 
Despite receiving instruction on the various aspects of the contract management 
process and procurement fraud, agents are not trained to the same level of detail as Air 
Force contracting officers (USAFSIA, 2014c). Accordingly, agents are taught to seek 
assistance from outside resources and subject matter experts when required. Besides 
obtaining support from Air Force contracting officers when necessary, agents are also 
encouraged to seek assistance from their servicing Assistant U.S. Attorney’s Office 
(AUSA) or auditors from the Air Force Audit Agency or Defense Contract Audit Agency 
(USAFSIA, 2013). When agents collaborate with these agencies, they are more likely to 
successfully investigate and prosecute allegations of fraud. 
After completion of CITP and BSIC, students are credentialed as federal agents 
for AFOSI (AFOSI Public Affairs Office, 2007). However, although agents, as federal 
law enforcement officers, operate with full authority to investigate allegations of crime 
affecting the Air Force, they do so on a probationary status in which they receive 
additional guidance, oversight, and on-the-job training (AFOSI Public Affairs Office, 
2011). 
c. Basic Extension Program 
Upon graduation, agents are assigned to AFOSI detachments around the world. 
As a result, agents investigate different types of crimes and gain different experience (C. 
Collins,  personal  communication,  June  29,  2015).  While  general  experience  was 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 47 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
important to the development of an agent, AFOSI recognized the need for a standardized 
program that required all new agents to meet specific experience objectives in proactive, 
real-world scenarios. Accordingly, USAFSIA developed and launched AFOSI BEP (C. 
Collins, personal communication, June 29, 2015). 
BEP was developed as a web-based, on-the-job training environment where, 
regardless of their location, agents receive the same level of training and familiarization 
with each of AFOSI’s mission sets. BEP covers counterintelligence, general crimes, and 
economic crimes and requires each agent in the program to complete specific online 
modules of instruction followed by real-world investigative steps (C. Collins, personal 
communication, June 29, 2015). BEP was also structured with open enrollment, which 
allows agents to complete different blocks of training in the order of their choosing. This 
provides flexibility and allows agents filling a specific role to begin with a BEP block in 
that same area (e.g., agents filling fraud billets can begin with the economic crimes 
block) (C. Collins, personal communication, June 29, 2015). 
Within the economic crimes block, agents are responsible for the completion of 
four online modules: “Contract File Review and FAR,” “Fundamentals of Economic 
Crimes,” “Investigative Tools and Supporting Agencies,” and “Prosecutorial 
Jurisdiction” (C. Collins, personal communication, June 29, 2015). Throughout these 
modules, agents look at the uniform contract format, the FAR, and major fraud schemes 
(USAFSIA, 2015a, 2015c). These areas serve as a general introduction and are mostly 
used to familiarize agents with the different aspects and terms of contracting (C. Collins, 
personal communication, June 29, 2015). In addition to the online training modules, 
agents are also required to complete several investigative steps followed by written 
assignments to demonstrate proficiency in the subject areas. Written assignments include 
a narrative of the identification of a fraud target, results of a contract review, a fraud 
investigation plan, a DODIG subpoena, and proper identification of applicable federal 
fraud statutes to an investigation. 
The BEP forces agents to gain experience through real-world proactive steps, 
which require agents to identify and meet with their local contracting office as well as 
quality assurance personnel to identify any perceived vulnerabilities (C. Collins, personal  
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communication, June 29, 2015). This information will be used to develop a fraud plan 
with specific objectives and targets to focus their investigative efforts (HQ AFOSI/XRG, 
2009). Once a fraud plan is established, agents conduct a proactive investigation starting 
with a comprehensive review of a contract file as well as a review of the respective 
government contractor (C. Collins, personal communication, June 29, 2015). 
Throughout  the  entire  BEP  curriculum,  agents  communicate  with  USAFSIA 
economic crimes instructors who provide feedback on their performance. The instructors 
also  assess  agents’  performance  and  give  guidance  and  recommendations 
investigative steps may be helpful to the investigation (C. Collins, 
communication,  June  29,  2015).  Upon  conclusion  of  the  program,  agents 
on  what 
personal 
are  fully 
credentialed federal agents and have had some relevant exposure to investigating 
procurement fraud. Accordingly, they will also have identified and developed 
relationships with pertinent local Air Force contracting squadron personnel, quality 
assurance personnel, auditors, other investigative agencies, and their servicing AUSA. 
This is an added benefit to the requirements of BEP in that it fosters a relationship 
between AFOSI and other agencies and sets the stage for future partnerships in targeting 
fraud (C. Collins, personal communication, June 29, 2015). 
d. Advanced Training 
Agents meet the minimum training requirements to investigate procurement fraud 
upon completion of BSIC. However, a training needs assessment identified that agents 
specializing in procurement fraud needed advanced training that was specific to the 
mission set. Due to the complexity often associated with fraud schemes, agents need to 
have the ability to conduct an economic analysis to identify and follow the money trail 
from ill-gotten gains. AFOSI found a solution at FLETC, as it had several advanced fraud 
courses available (C. King, personal communication, July 1, 2015). To develop the skills 
of the investigative force, AFOSI collaborated with FLETC to send agents through 
advanced   procurement   fraud–specific   courses   such   as   the   Procurement   Fraud 
Investigation  Training  (PFIT),  Product  Substitution  Investigations  Training  (PSIT), 
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Economic Crimes Investigation and Analysis (ECIA), and Money Laundering and Asset 
Forfeiture Training (MLAFT) (C. King, personal communication, July 1, 2015). 
Available courses managed and taught by instructors at FLETC are designed to 
provide agents with comprehensive training on major procurement fraud schemes that are 
common within the DOD (C. Collins, personal communication, June 29, 2015). Each of 
these courses provides specific details on a procurement fraud area of focus, but a 
common theme throughout all the courses is the in-depth knowledge of the contract 
management process. This allows agents to better identify what schemes are commonly 
used to commit fraud and where in the process the violations frequently occurred 
(FLETC Office of Chief Counsel, 2015). These programs also place considerable 
emphasis on the contract management process and the importance of investigators to 
understand it in order to effectively conduct procurement fraud investigations (FLETC, 
2015b). Although these additional training courses are not mandatory, they are 
encouraged for agents who specialize in procurement fraud or have an interest in this area 
(C. King, personal communication, July 1, 2015). 
Aside from the advanced training at FLETC, AFOSI also sought additional 
training through the Inspector General Academy and has considered offering the 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) certification to a select few agents 
within OPF (C. King, personal communication, July 1, 2015). The ACFE credential is 
awarded to individuals who have considerable training and experience in fraud detection 
and deterrence as well as pass a professional certification exam (ACFE, 2015). Currently, 
AFOSI has approximately 17 agents holding the CFE certification, although not all those 
agents are currently assigned to a billet within OPF (C. King, personal communication, 
July 1, 2015). 
While advanced training would enable an AFOSI agent to become more familiar 
with procurement fraud schemes, the contract management process, and conducting 
investigations, the advanced training is not required. Still, an agent is responsible to 
investigate allegations of fraudulent activity regardless of the agent’s level of training. 
The  investigative  process  for  procurement  fraud  is  similar  to  that  of  other  crimes; 
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however, fraud cases can be the most challenging to investigate, as ultimately, agents are 
attempting to find a “documented lie” (HQ AFOSI/XRG, 2009, p. 25). 
4. AFOSI Procurement Fraud Investigative Process 
The 83 agents in the AFOSI Office of Procurement Fraud (OPF) are assigned 
throughout the 22 operating locations of OPF. These agents are responsible for 
investigating procurement fraud within major central/systems acquisitions (C. King, 
personal communication, July 1, 2015). AFOSI’s authority to investigate procurement 
fraud stems from the Inspector General Act of 1978 and includes all fraud investigations, 
including theft/embezzlement, public corruption, antitrust, false statements/claims, and 
many other matters (HQ AFOSI/XRG, 2009). AFOSI also coordinated with the Air Force 
Air Staff in order to identify the following investigative priorities on which to focus its 
efforts: 












other (HQ AFOSI/XRG, 2015) 
Despite having Air Staff priorities, AFOSI has limited resources, and 
investigations can be extremely lengthy, making it impossible to conduct a substantial 
investigation on every allegation (C. King, personal communication, July 1, 2015). 
AFOSI tests each allegation and determines if it meets the threshold for further 
investigation and refers cases that do not meet the threshold to proper channels (HQ 
AFOSI/XRG, 2009). 
AFOSI agents manage the economic crime mission through a constant cycle (see 
Figure 6). This cycle assists agents to identify vulnerabilities by conducting an 
“Economic Crime Threat Assessment” and then develop a cooperative strategy with the 
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vulnerable organization (HQ AFOSI/XRG, 2015). Agents investigate allegations that 
meet minimum thresholds for a substantive investigation, and once the investigation 
reaches a logical conclusion, AFOSI refers the completed report to the servicing 
prosecutor.   Throughout   the   investigative   process,   agents   ensure   every   possible 
investigative step is completed. This often requires work with other external agencies, 
such as audit agencies and the AUSA (C. Collins, personal communication, 
2015). 
June 29, 
Figure 6. Economic Crime Threat Assessment and Identification Cycle 
Source: Headquarters Air Force Office of Special Investigations (HQ AFOSI/XRG). 
(2015). Procurement fraud investigations (Manual 71–122), p. 13. Quantico, VA: AFOSI 
Although agents are constantly seeking fraudulent activity, not every investigative 
step leads to criminal prosecution. As a result, it can be difficult to measure success with 
any objective metrics (C. King, personal communication, July 1, 2015). Accordingly, 
AFOSI  measures  success  by  evaluating  investigative  sufficiency  and  timeliness 
individual  investigations.  The  overall  procurement  fraud  program  is  measured 




investigations (HQ AFOSI/XRG, 2009; C. King, personal communication, July 1, 2015). 
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Since its activation in October 2013 until July 2015, AFOSI OPF has been 
responsible for the investigation of 191 allegations of fraudulent activity, during which 
agents identified 362 criminal subjects. Upon the conclusion of these investigations, 
AFOSI’s efforts led to the recovery of more than $790 million to the government (C. 
King, personal communication, July 1, 2015). 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a background on the procurement environment of the DOD 
and Air Force and on the history and evolution of AFOSI as the investigative agency for 
the Air Force. Additionally, this chapter presented the training requirements required for 
all AFOSI agents as well as some advanced procurement fraud investigation training 
available for agents. This chapter identified the investigative priorities for AFOSI and a 
simplified breakdown of the AFOSI investigation process for economic crimes. 
To ensure auditability in the Air Force, agents should be competent not only in 
procurement fraud but also with the contract management process. The purpose of this 
research is  to  assess AFOSI’s procurement fraud agents’ knowledge of the contract 
management  process  and  procurement  fraud schemes,  as  well  as  to  evaluate  their 
perception of knowledge in  these 
methodology used in this research. 
areas. The next chapter, Chapter IV, presents the 
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This chapter covers the methodology used in this research. Specifically, this 
chapter discusses the development of the assessment tool, the deployment of the 
assessment tool, and the method of analysis. The assessment tool was composed of 
questions related to the contract management process and major procurement fraud 
schemes discussed in Chapter II to assess Air Force Office of Special Investigations 
(AFOSI) procurement fraud agents’ knowledge in those areas. Additionally, the 
assessment  tool  assessed  the  agents’  perceptions  of  their  knowledge  of  the  contract 
management process. 
B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ASSESSMENT TOOL 
The purpose of this research is to assess AFOSI’s procurement fraud agents’ 
knowledge of the contract management process and procurement fraud schemes, as well 
as to evaluate their perception of knowledge in these areas. This research continues a 
research stream on fraud vulnerability and knowledge assessment of competent people 
previously researched by Chang (2013) and Castillo and Flanigan (2014). This research 
study continues the research on auditability, specifically, the focus of having competent 
people. Having competent people not only includes contracting officers being 
knowledgeable of procurement fraud schemes, but also procurement fraud agents being 
knowledgeable of the contract management process. The assessment tool used in this 
research contained a mixture of knowledge-based questions for each phase of the contract 
management process and procurement fraud schemes to assess AFOSI agents’ knowledge 
in these areas. This research also includes Likert Scale questions to assess the agents’ 
own perceptions of their knowledge of the contract management process, procurement 
fraud schemes, and their ability to perform their jobs adequately with their knowledge 
levels in these areas. The anonymous, voluntary survey was deployed online using the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) supported LimeSurvey web-based tool. 
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1. Sources Used to Develop Questions 
The 
Association 
Federal  Acquisition  Regulation  (FAR),  National  Contract  Management 
(NCMA) certification study guides, past research (Chang, 2013), and the 
researchers’ own experiences were all used to develop the assessment tool. Chang’s 
assessment tool was developed using information from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID), Office of the Inspector General, and the Office of Investigation’s 
Fraud Indicators Handbook (Chang, 2013). Questions used from Chang’s survey in this 
assessment tool were related to procurement fraud. The Likert Scale questions were 
developed as a method of assessing AFOSI procurement fraud agents’ perceptions of 
their  knowledge  of  the  phases  of  the  contract  management  process  and  major 
procurement fraud schemes. 
2. Development of Knowledge Questions 
The knowledge questions were developed with the goal of accurately assessing 
each participant’s knowledge of the contract management process and procurement fraud 
schemes. Since the goal of this research is to assess AFOSI procurement fraud agents’ 
knowledge of contract management process, the knowledge questions in the assessment 
tool were divided among the phases of the contract management process. Some phases 
were weighted heavier with more questions than others because there were more topics to 
cover within those phases. Additionally, each section contained one question related to 
procurement fraud and one scenario-based question related to that particular phase of the 
contract management process. A concerted effort was made to ensure participants could 
not easily look up answers to the questions; however, some answers drew directly from 
regulations such as the FAR and could be searched. Prior to deployment of the survey, 
survey questions were analyzed by subject matter experts for readability, 
understandability, and clarity. 
3. Development of Perception Questions 
In  addition  to  general  knowledge  questions  and  demographics  questions,  the 
survey asked participants seven questions regarding their perception of how much they 
knew  about  the  phases  of  the  contract  management  process  and  procurement  fraud  
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 55 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
schemes to perform their fraud investigative duties. These survey questions used a 5- 
point Likert Scale with possible answers ranging from “strongly agree” (5) to “strongly 
disagree” (1). Participants  assessed their  own  knowledge level  of the phases of the 
contract management process and procurement fraud schemes. 
4. Development of Demographic Questions 
The demographic questions were designed to collect information about survey 
participants’ backgrounds. Questions consisted of employment category (i.e., military 
officer, enlisted, or civilian), years of experience as a credentialed AFOSI agent, years of 
experience working in procurement fraud, and ACFE certified fraud examiner status. 
These questions enabled the identification of specific patterns among different groups of 
survey respondents. 
C. DEPLOYMENT OF THE ASSESSMENT TOOL 
Prior to the deployment of the survey, all appropriate Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) procedures were followed. Upon IRB approval, the survey was deployed using the 
NPS LimeSurvey web-based tool and disseminated to AFOSI agents assigned to the 
AFOSI Office of Procurement Fraud (OPF) via an e-mail containing the link to the 
website hosting the survey. The survey was available for six weeks. A follow-up e-mail 
was sent two weeks after the start of the survey to remind special agents to complete the 
survey if they had not done so already. The population size for this research consisted of 
the 83 agents within AFOSI’s OPF. Agents in the OPF consist of officers, enlisted, and 
civilian special agents with varying backgrounds and experience within AFOSI’s mission 
set (C. King, personal communication, July 1, 2015). 
D. ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESPONSES 
The data collected from the assessment tool was analyzed in Microsoft Excel 
using descriptive statistics. Questions were analyzed by each demographic for any 
patterns or potential relationship among the demographics. Particular attention was given 
to the questions that were most missed among the survey respondents as well as the 
questions with the highest percentage of correct answers. Results were analyzed for each 
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phase of the contract management process and the participants’ perceptions. The results 
were also compared to the participants’ demographics, which included employment 
category, years of AFOSI experience, years of fraud investigative experience, and 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) certification. Finally, the survey 
respondents’ performance on the knowledge-based questions was compared to their 
perception of their knowledge to identify any patterns and to determine the level of 
understanding of the contract management process and procurement fraud schemes. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the development of the assessment tool, the deployment of 
the assessment tool, and the method of analysis. This assessment tool was based on the 
survey used in Chang’s 2013 research, which assessed contracting personnel’s 
knowledge of procurement fraud schemes related to the contract management process, 
internal control components, and procurement fraud schemes and the contracting 
personnel’s perceptions in those areas. The purpose of this research is to assess AFOSI’s 
procurement fraud agents’ knowledge of the contract management process and 
procurement fraud schemes, as well as to evaluate their perception of knowledge in these 
areas. This research also evaluates agents’ perception of their knowledge of each of these 
areas. The next chapter, Chapter V, presents the findings, analysis, implications of this 
research, and recommendations based on this analysis. 
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V. FINDINGS, ANALYSIS, AND IMPLICATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the results of the assessment in order to identify Air Force 
Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) procurement fraud agents’ (hereafter referred to 
as agents) knowledge level of the contract management process and major procurement 
fraud schemes. This chapter also presents the agents’ perceptions of their knowledge in 
these areas. Results are grouped into three major areas: findings, analysis, and 
implications. Findings include information on the deployment of the assessment tool as 
well as an overview of the knowledge level of the research participants. The analysis 
provides a discussion of how employment category, experience in AFOSI, experience 
investigating procurement fraud, and certifications affected the agents’ knowledge levels. 
This chapter also compares agents’ actual knowledge, as identified by the 
assessment tool’s knowledge-based questions, to their perceived knowledge according to 
their responses to the perception questions. Implications consider the results from this 
research and compare it to the conclusions from previous research in order to fully 
establish the overall implications to the U.S. Air Force and the AFOSI organization. 
Finally, based on the results and implications, recommendations are provided to 
strengthen  AFOSI  procurement  fraud  agents’  knowledge  as  a  component  of  the 
auditability triangle. 
B. FINDINGS 
On July 29, 2015, the assessment tool was deployed on LimeSurvey and an e-mail 
was sent to the 83 agents assigned to procurement fraud units (PFUs) throughout AFOSI. 
The assessment tool was available for approximately six weeks and closed on September 
8, 2015. Out of the total population, 59 participants opened the assessment tool but only 
45 respondents completed the entire assessment. One respondent completed the 
knowledge portion of the assessment and terminated his or her participation prior to 
answering the demographic and perception questions. Findings on the knowledge portion 
of the assessment tool were based on all 46 respondents resulting in a response rate of 
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55.42  percent,  while  the  demographic  and  perception  questions  were  based  on  45 
respondents, resulting a response rate of 54.22 percent. 
An initial review of the overall results of all of the knowledge-based questions 
resulted in an average overall score of 61 percent among all respondents. The highest 
overall individual’s score was 89 percent with the lowest being 33 percent. When 
evaluated by question category, agents generally had the most knowledge about the 
solicitation phase (Phase 3) of the contract management process with an average score of 
87 percent (Figure 7). Conversely, agents had the least amount of knowledge about the 
solicitation planning phase (Phase 2) of the contract management process with an average 
score of 32 percent (Figure 7). Agents’ knowledge of procurement fraud was evaluated 
separately using specific questions on procurement fraud schemes occurring within the 
contract management process. Agents achieved an average score of 75 percent on 
procurement fraud scheme questions (Figure 7). Figure 7 shows a breakdown of average 
overall scores by knowledge-question category. 
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C. ANALYSIS 
1. Analysis by Employment Category 
Out of the 45 responses received for the demographic questions, 53 percent of the 
respondents were civilian agents, 11 percent were military officer agents, and 36 percent 
were enlisted agents. Figure 8 shows a visual depiction of the research respondents’ 
average overall score by employment category. Among the employment categories, 
civilian agents had the highest overall scores on the assessment with an average of 67 
percent (Figure 9). Officer agents scored an average of 56 percent, and enlisted agents 
scored an average of 54 percent (Figure 9). 
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Figure 9. Average Overall Scores by Employment Category 
a. Civilian Agents 
Out of the three employment categories, civilian agents had the highest overall 
scores on the assessment. Civilian agents also made up the most experienced category 
both with regard to time in AFOSI as well as time investigating procurement fraud. 
Additionally, 42 percent of civilian agents possessed the Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE) 
credential from the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE). Regarding 
experience in AFOSI, the majority of the civilian respondents, 29 percent, indicated that 
they had 6-10 years of experience in AFOSI (Figure 10). Conversely, the lowest response 
rate for civilian respondents, 21 percent, indicated that they had more than 20 years of 
experience in AFOSI (Figure 10). No civilian respondents had less than 3 years of 
experience  in  AFOSI.  Figure  10  provides  a  graphical  representation  of  the  AFOSI 
experience levels for civilian agents. 
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Figure 10. Civilian Agents’ Experience in AFOSI 
Additionally, when asked about experience investigating procurement fraud, the 
majority of the civilian respondents, 50 percent, indicated that they had 3-5 years of 
experience investigating procurement fraud (Figure 11). Conversely, the lowest response 
rate for civilian respondents, 8 percent, indicated that they had 0-2 years of experience 
investigating procurement fraud (Figure 11). No civilian respondents had more than 20 
years of experience investigating procurement fraud. Figure 11 provides a 
representation of civilian agents’ experience investigating procurement fraud. 
graphical 
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Civilian agents scored an average of 67 percent on the assessment overall (Figure 
12). Scores for knowledge-based questions were broken down by phase of the contract 
management process and a separate score for procurement fraud questions. Based on the 
results of the assessment, civilian agents were most knowledgeable about the solicitation 
phase (Phase 3) of the contract management process, with an average score of 88 percent 
on this phase (Figure 12). The lowest scores were in the solicitation planning phase 
(Phase 2), with an average score of 36 percent (Figure 12). Among the questions 
pertaining to procurement fraud, civilian agents had an average score of 75 percent. 
Figure 12 shows the average percentage of correct answers for the phases of the contract 
management process and for the procurement fraud questions. 
Figure 12. Civilian Agents: Average Scores for Knowledge-Based Questions 
b. Officer Agents 
Officer agents made up the smallest category in the sample and scored an average 
overall score of 56 percent on the knowledge-based questions (Figure 9). Additionally, 20 
percent of the officer agents possessed the Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE) credential 
from the ACFE. Regarding experience in AFOSI, 40 percent of the officer respondents 
indicated that they had 6-10 years of experience in AFOSI, and another 40 percent of the 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 63 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
officer respondents indicated that they had 0-2 years of experience in AFOSI (Figure 13). 
Conversely, the lowest response rate for officer respondents, 20 percent, indicated that 
they had 11-20 years of experience in AFOSI (Figure 13). No officer respondents had 3-5 
years of experience in AFOSI or more than 20 years of experience in AFOSI. Figure 13 
provides a graphical representation of the AFOSI experience levels for officer agents. 
Figure 13. Military Officer Agents Experience in AFOSI 
Additionally, when asked about experience investigating procurement fraud, the 
majority of the officer respondents, 60 percent, indicated that they had 3-5 years of 
experience investigating procurement fraud (Figure 14). Conversely, the lowest response 
rate for officer respondents, 40 percent, indicated that they had 0-2 years of experience 
investigating procurement fraud (Figure 14). No officer respondents had more than 5 
years of experience investigating procurement fraud. Figure 14 provides a graphical 
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Figure 14. Military Officer Agents Experience Investigating Procurement 
Fraud 
Military officer agents scored an average of 56 percent on the assessment overall 
(Figure 15). Scores for knowledge-based questions were broken down by phase of the 
contract management process and a separate score for procurement fraud questions. 
Based on the results of the assessment, officer agents were most knowledgeable about the 
contract closeout/termination phase (Phase 6) of the contract management process, with 
an average score of 70 percent on this phase (Figure 15). However, similar to the civilian 
agents, officer agents also scored lowest in the solicitation planning phase (Phase 2), with 
an average score of 27 percent (Figure 15). Among the questions pertaining to 
procurement fraud, officer agents had an average score of 77 percent. Figure 15 shows 
the average percentage of correct answers for the phases of the contract management 
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Figure 15. Officer Agents: Average Scores for Knowledge-Based Questions 
c. Enlisted Agents 
Enlisted agents scored an average overall score of 54 percent on the knowledge- 
based questions (Figure 9). Additionally, 13 percent of the enlisted agents possessed the 
CFE credential from the ACFE. Regarding experience in AFOSI, the majority of the 
enlisted respondents, 50 percent, indicated that they had 3-5 years of experience in 
AFOSI (Figure  16).  Conversely,  the  lowest  response  rate  for  enlisted  respondents, 
6 percent, indicated that they had 0-2 years of experience in AFOSI (Figure 16). None of 
the enlisted respondents had more than 10 years of experience in AFOSI. Figure 16 
provides a graphical representation of the AFOSI experience levels for enlisted agents. 
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Figure 16. Military Enlisted Agents Experience in AFOSI 
Additionally, when asked about experience investigating procurement fraud, the 
majority of the enlisted respondents, 81 percent, indicated that they had 0-2 years of 
experience investigating procurement fraud (Figure 17). Conversely, the lowest response 
rate for enlisted respondents, 6 percent, indicated that they had 6-10 years of experience 
investigating procurement fraud (Figure 17). No enlisted respondents had more than 10 
years of experience investigating procurement fraud. Figure 17 provides a graphical 
representation of enlisted agents’ experience investigating procurement fraud. 



























Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 67 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
Military enlisted agents scored an average of 54 percent on the assessment overall 
(Figure 18). Enlisted agents also generally had the least amount of investigative 
experience both with AFOSI as well as with investigating procurement fraud. Scores for 
knowledge-based questions were broken down by phase of the contract management 
process and a separate score for procurement fraud questions. Based on the results of the 
assessment, enlisted agents were most knowledgeable about the solicitation phase (Phase 
3) of the contract management process with an average score of 94 percent on this phase 
(Figure 18). Like both the civilian and officer agents, enlisted agents scored the lowest in 
the solicitation planning phase (Phase 2) of the contract management process with an 
average score of 25 percent (Figure 18). Among the questions pertaining to procurement 
fraud, enlisted agents had an average score of 75 percent. Figure 18 shows the average 
percentage of correct answers for the phases of the contract management process and for 
the procurement fraud questions. 
Figure 18. Enlisted Agents: Average Scores for Knowledge-Based Questions 
2. Analysis According to Experience with AFOSI 
In order to determine experience with AFOSI, agents participating in this research 
were asked to provide the number of years of experience that they had as a credentialed 
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AFOSI special agent after graduating from the Federal Law Enforcement Training center 
(FLETC) or post-FLETC. Respondents had the option to choose from the following: 
a. 0–2 years 
b. 3–5 years 
c. 6–10 years 
d. 11–20 years 
e. 20+ years 
Selection “a” (0-2 years) was listed as an option because new AFOSI agents are 
typically serving in a probationary status for the first 18 months after graduating from the 
Basic Special Investigations Course (BSIC) at FLETC. This category (0-2 years) 
permitted the identification of agents that were relatively new to AFOSI and still on or 
had recently completed probationary time. It also permitted an understanding of the 
amount of knowledge agents had upon completion of the initial AFOSI training. Out of 
the 45 respondents, the majority of respondents, 36 percent, had 6-10 years of experience 
with AFOSI (Figure 19). The category with the least individuals was 0-2 years of 
experience, which included 7 percent of the respondents. Figure 19 provides a visual 
representation of the investigative experience of AFOSI special agents that participated in 
this research. 
Figure 19. Agent Experience in AFOSI 
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Results of the assessment indicated that the more experience an agent had with 
AFOSI, the higher the average overall score on the knowledge-based questions. Agents 
with 0-2 years of experience with AFOSI achieved an average overall score of 48 percent 
(Figure 20). The average overall score increased to 57 percent for agents with 3-5 years 
of experience. The average overall score for agents with 6-10 years of experience 
increased to 64 percent, and the average overall score peaked for agents with 11-20 years 
of experience with an average score of 65 percent (Figure 20). While a trend indicated a 
relationship between scores and experience, the average overall score of agents with 
more than 20 years of experience decreased to 64 percent. Figure 20 shows the average 
scores of agents by experience category. 
Figure 20. Average Overall Scores According to Experience in AFOSI 
With the exception of agents with 0-2 years of experience with AFOSI, a pattern 
developed indicating that agents were generally most knowledgeable about the 
solicitation phase (Phase 3) of the contract management process. Collectively, the 
average overall score for all agents was 87 percent on the solicitation phase (Figure 7). 
However, if agents with 0-2 years of experience are excluded, the average overall score 
for knowledge-questions pertaining to the solicitation phase increases to 91  percent 
among the remaining categories of experience. Conversely, agents with 0-2 years of 
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The second phase in which agents scored the highest was the contract 
closeout/termination phase (Phase 6). Collectively, the average overall score  for  all 
agents was 72 percent on the contract closeout/termination phase. However, if agents 
with 0-2 years of experience are excluded, the average overall score for knowledge 
questions pertaining to the contract closeout/termination phase increases to 74 percent 
among the remaining categories of experience. Conversely, agents with 0-2 years of 
experience in AFOSI achieved their highest average overall score in the contract 
closeout/termination phase of the contract management process with an average overall 
score of 50 percent. 
Finally, collectively, the average overall score was the lowest on knowledge 
questions pertaining to the solicitation planning phase (Phase 2) of the contract 
management process with an average overall score of 32 percent (Figure 7). However, if 
agents with 0-2 years of experience are excluded, the average overall score for 
knowledge questions pertaining to the solicitation planning phase decreases to 30 percent 
among the remaining categories of experience. It should be noted that agents with 0-2 
years of experience in AFOSI achieved an average overall score of 44 percent on 
knowledge  questions  pertaining  to  the  solicitation  planning  phase  of  the  contract 
management process. 
Despite an increasing trend of scores on knowledge-based questions about the 
contract management process, average overall scores pertaining to procurement fraud 
schemes did not seem to be affected by the number of years of experience an agent had 
within AFOSI. The average overall scores among all agents for procurement fraud 
questions was 75 percent; however, the average score between each of the experience 
categories only varied by 10-points. Agents with 0-2 years’ time in AFOSI scored an 
average of 72 percent on procurement fraud questions; however, scores decreased to an 
average of 70 percent for agents with 3-5 years of experience (Figure 21). Agents with 6- 
10 years and agents with more than 20 years of experience both scored an average of 80 
percent on knowledge questions pertaining to procurement fraud schemes. Figure 21 
shows  the  average  scores  on  procurement  fraud  questions  according  to  AFOSI 
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experience.  Appendix  A  shows  the  average  scores  for  each  category  of  experience 
according to question type. 
Figure 21. Average Scores on Procurement Fraud by Experience in AFOSI 
3. Analysis According to Experience Investigating Procurement Fraud 
In order to determine experience investigating procurement fraud, AFOSI agents 
that participated in this research were asked to provide the number of years of experience 
they had investigating procurement fraud. Respondents had the option to choose from the 
following: 
a. 0-2 years 
b. 3-5 years 
c. 6-10 years 
d. 11-20 years 
e. 20+ years 
Similar to the question regarding the number of years of experience with AFOSI, 
selection “a” (0-2 years) was listed as an option because new AFOSI agents are typically 
serving in a probationary status for the first 18 months after graduating from BSIC at 
FLETC. When compared to agent experience in AFOSI, this category (0-2 years), 
allowed for analysis to determine which agents were relatively new to AFOSI and still on 
or  had  recently  completed  probationary time,  as  well  as  were  new  to  investigating 
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procurement fraud. Out of the 45 respondents, 76 percent of the respondents had five or 
less years of experience investigating procurement fraud. Agents with 0-2 years made up 
38 percent of the sample, and agents with 3-5 years made up another 38 percent (Figure 
22). None of the agents that participated in this research had more than 20 years of 
experience investigating procurement fraud, and only 11 percent of the agents had more 
than 10 years of experience. Figure 22, provides a visual representation of the experience 
of AFOSI agents investigating procurement fraud. 
Figure 22. AFOSI Agent Experience Investigating Procurement Fraud 
Agents with 0-2 years of experience investigating procurement fraud achieved an 
average overall score of 54 percent (Figure 23). Scores were highest among agents with 
3-5 years and 6-10 years of experience with each group scoring an average overall score 
of 66 percent (Figure 23). From there, despite agents gaining experience, average overall 
scores decreased slightly to 64 percent for agents with 11-20 years of experience. Figure 
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Figure 23. Average Overall Scores based on Experience Investigating 
Procurement Fraud 
Similar  to  the  experience  in  AFOSI  category,  agents  were  generally most 
knowledgeable about the solicitation phase (Phase 3) of the contract management process 
with an average overall score of 87 percent (Figure 7). Agents with 0-2 years of 
experience investigating procurement fraud scored an average overall score of 71 percent 
in the solicitation phase. It should be noted that if the 0-2 year category is excluded, the 
average overall score in the solicitation phase is 96 percent for agents with more than two 
years of experience investigating procurement fraud. 
The phase in which agents scored the second highest was the contract 
closeout/termination phase (Phase 6) with an average overall score of 72 percent. In 
contrast, all agents, regardless of the level of procurement fraud investigative experience, 
generally scored the lowest on knowledge questions pertaining to the solicitation 
planning phase (Phase 2) of the contract management process with an average score of 31 
percent. This indicates a general lack of knowledge or understanding on the solicitation 
planning phase. 
The average overall score on the procurement fraud scheme questions was 75 
percent. Scores pertaining to procurement fraud were highest among agents with 11-20 
years of experience investigating procurement fraud with an average overall score of 80 
percent (Figure 24). Scores for agents with five or less years of experience investigating 
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procurement fraud was 75 percent (Figure 24). The lowest scores were among agents 
with 6-10 years of experience investigating procurement fraud, with an average overall 
score of 69 percent on knowledge questions pertaining to procurement fraud schemes. 
Figure 24 shows the average overall scores on procurement fraud questions according to 
agent experience investigating procurement fraud. Appendix B shows the average scores 
for each category of procurement fraud investigative experience according to question 
type. 
Figure 24. Average Scores on Procurement Fraud Questions based on 
Experience Investigating Procurement Fraud 
4. Analysis for Agents with Certified Fraud Examiner Credential 
Out of the 45 agents that completed the demographic questions, 29 percent were 
credentialed by the ACFE. On average, CFE agents scored 14 percent higher on the entire 
assessment than agents without the credential. CFEs scored 17 percent higher on 
knowledge questions relating to the phases of the contract management process and 8 
percent higher on knowledge questions related to procurement fraud schemes. Figure 25 
shows a comparison of scores between agents with the CFE credential and agents without 
the credential. Agents with the CFE credential scored higher in each of the knowledge- 
based question categories than agents without the credential. However, like other groups, 
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the solicitation planning phase (Phase 2) of the contract management process with an 
average overall score of 46 percent. Additionally, CFEs scored highest on knowledge 
questions about the solicitation phase with 100 percent correct. Appendix C shows a 
comparison of knowledge levels on each of the categories of questions on the assessment 
tool between agents with the CFE credential and agents without the credential. 
Figure 25. Average Overall Scores for Agents With and Agents Without the 
CFE Credential 
5. Perception 
The  assessment  tool  consisted  of  eight  perception-based  questions. 
questions  asked  participants  to  rate  each  statement  on  a  five-point  Likert 














I don’t know 
Each of the answers corresponded to a number value that was used to determine 
the  perception  mean  of  the  respondents.  “Strongly agree”  was  rated  as  five  points, 
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disagree” was one point, and “I don’t know” was zero points. Though responses varied, it 
should be noted that none of the respondents selected “I don’t know” for any of the 
questions. 
Six of the questions were used to assess the respondents’ perceptions of their 
knowledge among the phases of the contract management process. One question was 
used to assess the respondents’ perception of their knowledge of procurement fraud. The 
last question was used to identify the perception of agents regarding the adequacy of 
procurement fraud investigation training provided by AFOSI. 
Out of the 46 agents who participated in the research, 45 agents completed the 
perception-based questions of the assessment tool. The assessment tool asked participants 
if they had adequate knowledge of each phase of the contract management process 
(procurement  planning, 
administration,  contract 
investigative  duties.  In 
solicitation  planning,  solicitation,  source  selection,  contract 
closeout/termination)  in  order  to  perform  procurement  fraud 
addition,  in  order  to  prevent  confusion,  each  question  also 
provided a brief description of the major functions occurring within its respective phase. 
Table 3 provides the results of the perception-based questions and reflects the perception 
mean of the respondents for each question. 
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Table 3. Means of Perception-Based Questions 
Perception Mean 
5: Strongly Agree – 
1: Strongly Disagree 
Perception-based Questions 
I have adequate knowledge of the Procurement Planning Phase of the 
contract management to perform procurement fraud investigative 
duties. 
3.16 
I have adequate knowledge of the Solicitation Planning Phase of the 
contract management process to perform procurement fraud 
investigative duties. 
3.24 
I have adequate knowledge of the Solicitation Phase of the contract 
management process to perform procurement fraud investigative duties. 
3.36 
I have adequate knowledge of the Source Selection Phase of the 
contract management process to perform procurement fraud 
investigative duties. 
3.38 
I have adequate knowledge of the Contract Administration Phase of the 
contract management to perform procurement fraud investigative 
duties. 
3.36 
I have adequate knowledge of the Contract Closeout/Termination Phase 
of the contract management process to perform procurement fraud 
investigative duties. 
3.20 
I have adequate knowledge of Procurement Fraud Schemes to perform 
procurement fraud investigative duties. 4.09 
AFOSI provides adequate training on contracting in order to effectively 
investigate procurement fraud. 2.69 
3.28 Total Perception Mean 
(1) Procurement planning 
When asked about the procurement planning phase (Phase 1) of the contract 
management process, the majority of the agents, 49 percent (number of agents [n]=22), 
selected “agree” (Figure 26). The least selected response, 4 percent of the agents (n=2), 
was “strongly agree” (Figure 26). None of the respondents selected “I don’t know” (n=0) 
(Figure 26). The perception mean for all respondents was 3.16 on the Likert Scale (Table 
3), which indicates a general perception of slightly above “neutral” about their 
knowledge  on  the  procurement  planning  phase.  However,  the  average  overall  score 
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phase of the contract  management process was 60 percent (Figure 7). By academic 
standards, this would be equivalent to a grade of “D.” 
Out of the 45 respondents, 4 percent of the agents (n=2), selected “strongly agree” 
when asked if they perceived that they had adequate knowledge of the procurement 
planning phase (Phase 1) of the contract management process to perform procurement 
fraud investigative duties (Figure 26). The average overall score for these agents on 
procurement planning phase related knowledge questions was 70 percent (Figure 26). By 
academic standards, this would be equivalent to a grade of “C.” Additionally, 49 percent 
of the agents (n=22) selected “agree” when asked if they perceived that they had adequate 
knowledge of the procurement planning phase of the contract management process to 
perform procurement fraud investigative duties (Figure 26). However, agents that 
selected “agree” achieved an average overall score of 62 percent on procurement 
planning phase related knowledge questions (Figure 26). By academic standards, this 
would be equivalent to a grade of “D.” 
In order to assess the knowledge of the respondents with the perception that they 
had adequate knowledge, responses of “agree” and “strongly agree” were combined and 
assessed. In the procurement planning phase, 53 percent of the agents (n=24), responded 
with “agree” or “strongly agree.” Despite the perception that they had sufficient 
knowledge, when analyzed, the average overall score of these agents for this phase was 
63 percent. By academic standards, this would be equivalent to a grade of “D.” In 
comparison,  CFEs  achieved  an  average  overall  score  of  66  percent  on  knowledge 
questions in this phase. 
In contrast, 9 percent of the agents (n=4), selected “strongly disagree” when asked 
if they perceived that they had adequate knowledge of the procurement planning phase of 
the contract management process to perform procurement fraud investigative duties 
(Figure 26). The average overall score for agents selecting “strongly disagree” was 45 
percent (Figure 26). By academic standards, this would be equivalent to a grade of “F.” 
Additionally, agents that selected “disagree” (24 percent; n=11) scored an average overall 
score of 58 percent on knowledge questions pertaining to the procurement planning phase 
on the assessment (Figure 26). By academic standards, this would be equivalent to the  
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grade  of  “F.”  Figure  26  shows  the  average  overall  score  of  agents  on  knowledge 
questions relating to the procurement planning phase of the contract management process 
based on their perception of knowledge for this phase. 
Figure 26. Average Overall Score by Perception of Knowledge of 
Procurement Planning 
AFOSI Agents participating in the assessment rated their perception of their knowledge 
about the procurement planning phase of the contract management process to perform 
their procurement fraud investigative duties. Agents had five options to select ranging 
from“strongly agree” to “strongly disagree,” or “I don’t know.” Here, “n” represents the 
number of respondents selecting a specific response (strongly agree – I don’t know), 
while the average overall knowledge score for each response is identifed as a percent. 
(2) Solicitation planning 
When asked about the solicitation planning phase (Phase 2) of the contract 
management process, the majority of the agents, 51 percent (n=23), selected “agree” 
(Figure 27). The least selected responses were, “strongly agree,” 4 percent of the agents 
(n=2), and “strongly disagree,” 4 percent of the agents (n=2) (Figure 27). None of the 
respondents selected “I don’t know” (n=0) (Figure 27). The perception mean for all 
respondents was 3.24 on the Likert Scale (Table 3), which indicates a general perception 
of slightly above “neutral” about their knowledge on the solicitation planning phase. 
However, the average overall score among all respondents for the knowledge-based 
questions on the solicitation planning phase of the contract management process was 32 
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Out of the 45 respondents, 4 percent of the agents (n=2), selected “strongly agree” 
when asked if they perceived that they had adequate knowledge of the solicitation 
planning phase (Phase 2) of the contract management process to perform procurement 
fraud investigative duties (Figure 27). The average overall score for these agents on 
solicitation planning phase related knowledge questions was 50 percent (Figure 27). By 
academic standards, this would be equivalent to a grade of “F.” Additionally, 51 percent 
of the agents (n=23) selected “agree” when asked if they perceived that they had adequate 
knowledge of the solicitation planning phase of the contract management process to 
perform procurement fraud investigative duties (Figure 27). However, agents that 
selected “agree” achieved an average overall score of 32 percent on solicitation planning 
phase related knowledge questions (Figure 27). By academic standards, this would be 
equivalent to a grade of “F.” 
In order to assess the knowledge of the respondents with the perception that they 
had adequate knowledge, responses of “agree” and “strongly agree” were combined and 
assessed. In the solicitation planning phase, 56 percent of the agents (n=25) responded 
with “agree” or “strongly agree." Despite the perception that they had sufficient 
knowledge, when analyzed, the average overall score of these agents for this phase was 
33 percent. By academic standards, this would be equivalent to a grade of “F.” In 
comparison,  CFEs  achieved  an  average  overall  score  of  46  percent  on  knowledge 
questions in this phase. 
In contrast, 4 percent of the agents (n=2), selected “strongly disagree” when asked 
if they perceived that they had adequate knowledge of the solicitation planning phase of 
the contract management process to perform procurement fraud investigative duties 
(Figure 27). The average overall score for agents selecting “strongly disagree” was zero 
percent (Figure 27). By academic standards, this would be equivalent to a grade of “F.” 
Additionally, agents that selected “disagree” (27 percent; n=12) scored an average overall 
score of 22 percent on knowledge questions pertaining to the solicitation planning phase 
on the assessment (Figure 27). By academic standards, this would be equivalent to the 
grade  of  “F.”  Figure  27  shows  the  average  overall  score  of  agents  on  knowledge 
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questions relating to the solicitation planning phase of the contract management process 
based on their perception of knowledge for this phase. 
Figure 27. Average Score by Perception of Knowledge of Solicitation 
Planning 
AFOSI Agents participating in the assessment rated their perception of their knowledge 
about the solicitation planning phase of the contract management process to perform their 
procurement fraud investigative duties. Agents had five options to select ranging 
from“strongly agree” to “strongly disagree,” or “I don’t know.” Here, “n” represents the 
number of respondents selecting a specific response (strongly agree – I don’t know), 
while the average overall knowledge score for each response is identifed as a percent. 
(3) Solicitation 
When asked about the solicitation phase (Phase 3) of the contract management 
process, the majority of the agents, 49 percent (n=22), selected “agree” (Figure 28). The 
least selected response, 2 percent of the agents (n=1), was “strongly disagree” (Figure 
28). None of the respondents selected “I don’t know” (n=0) (Figure 28). The perception 
mean for all respondents was 3.36 on the Likert Scale (Table 3), which indicates a 
general perception of slightly above “neutral” about their knowledge on the solicitation 
phase. However, the average overall score among all respondents for the knowledge- 
based questions on the solicitation phase of the contract management process was 87 
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Out of the 45 respondents, 7 percent of the agents (n=3), selected “strongly agree” 
when asked if they perceived that they had adequate knowledge of the solicitation phase 
(Phase 3) of the contract management process to perform procurement fraud investigative 
duties (Figure 28). The average overall score for these agents on solicitation phase related 
knowledge questions was 100 percent (Figure 28). By academic standards, this would be 
equivalent to a grade of “A.” Additionally, 49 percent of the agents (n=22) selected 
“agree” when asked if they perceived that they had adequate knowledge of the 
solicitation phase of the contract management process to perform procurement fraud 
investigative duties (Figure 28). Agents that selected “agree” also achieved an average 
overall score of 100 percent on solicitation phase related knowledge questions (Figure 
28). By academic standards, this would also be equivalent to a grade of “A.” 
In order to assess the knowledge of the respondents with the perception that they 
had adequate knowledge, responses of “agree” and “strongly agree” were combined and 
assessed. In the solicitation phase, 56 percent of the agents (n=25) responded  with 
“agree” or “strongly agree.” When analyzed, the average overall score of these agents for 
this phase was 100 percent. By academic standards, this would be equivalent to a grade 
of “A.” In comparison, CFEs also achieved an average overall score of 100 percent on 
knowledge questions in this phase. 
In contrast, 2 percent of the agents (n=1), selected “strongly disagree” when asked 
if they perceived that they had adequate knowledge of the solicitation phase of the 
contract management process to perform procurement fraud investigative duties (Figure 
28). The average overall score for agents selecting “strongly disagree” was zero percent 
(Figure 28). By academic standards, this would be equivalent to a grade of “F.” 
Additionally, agents that selected “disagree” (22 percent; n=10) scored an average overall 
score of 90 percent on knowledge questions pertaining to the solicitation phase on the 
assessment (Figure 28). By academic standards, this would be equivalent to the grade of 
“A.” Figure 28 shows the average overall score of agents on knowledge  questions 
relating to the solicitation phase of the contract management process based on their 
perception of knowledge for this phase. 
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Figure 28. Average Score by Perception of Knowledge of Solicitation Phase 
AFOSI Agents participating in the assessment rated their perception of their knowledge 
about the solicitation phase of the contract management process to perform their 
procurement fraud investigative duties. Agents had five options to select ranging 
from“strongly agree” to “strongly disagree,” or “I don’t know.” Here, “n” represents the 
number of respondents selecting a specific response (strongly agree – I don’t know), 
while the average overall knowledge score for each response is identifed as a percent. 
(4) Source selection 
When asked about the source selection phase (Phase 4) of the contract 
management process, the majority of the agents, 51 percent (n=23), selected “agree” 
(Figure 29). The least selected response, 2 percent of the agents (n=1), was “strongly 
disagree” (Figure 29). None of the respondents selected “I don’t know” (n=0) (Figure 
29). The perception mean for all respondents was 3.38 on the Likert Scale (Table 3), 
which indicates a general perception of slightly above “neutral” about their knowledge on 
the source selection phase. However, the average overall score among all respondents for 
the knowledge-based questions on the source selection phase of the contract management 
process was 57 percent (Figure 7). By academic standards, this would be equivalent to a 
grade of “F.” 
Out of the 45 respondents, 7 percent of the agents (n=3), selected “strongly agree” 
when asked if they perceived that they had adequate knowledge of the source selection 
phase  (Phase  4)  of  the  contract  management  process  to  perform  procurement  fraud 
investigative duties (Figure 29). The average overall score for these agents on source 
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selection phase related knowledge questions was 27 percent (Figure 29). By academic 
standards, this would be equivalent to a grade of “F.” Additionally, 51 percent of the 
agents (n=23) selected “agree” when asked if they perceived that they had adequate 
knowledge of the source selection phase of the contract management process to perform 
procurement fraud investigative duties (Figure 29). However, agents that selected “agree” 
achieved an average overall score of 67 percent on source selection phase related 
knowledge questions (Figure 29). By academic standards, this would be equivalent to a 
grade of “D.” 
In order to assess the knowledge of the respondents with the perception that they 
had adequate knowledge, responses of “agree” and “strongly agree” were combined and 
assessed. In the source selection phase, 58 percent of the agents (n=26) responded with 
“agree” or “strongly agree.” Despite the perception that they had sufficient knowledge, 
when analyzed, the average overall score of these agents for this phase was 62 percent. 
By academic standards, this would be equivalent to a grade of “D.” In comparison, CFEs 
achieved an average overall score of 68 percent on knowledge questions in this phase. 
In contrast, 2 percent of the agents (n=1), selected “strongly disagree” when asked 
if they perceived that they had adequate knowledge of the source selection phase of the 
contract management process to perform procurement fraud investigative duties (Figure 
29). The average overall score for agents selecting “strongly disagree” was 40 percent 
(Figure 29). By academic standards, this would be equivalent to a grade of “F.” 
Additionally, agents that selected “disagree” (22 percent; n=10) scored an average overall 
score of 56 percent on knowledge questions pertaining to the source selection phase on 
the assessment (Figure 29). By academic standards, this would be equivalent to the grade 
of “F.” Figure 29 shows the average overall score of agents on knowledge questions 
relating to the source selection phase of the contract management process based on their 
perception of knowledge for this phase. 
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Figure 29. Average Score by Perception of Knowledge of Source Selection 
Phase 
AFOSI Agents participating in the assessment rated their perception of their knowledge 
about the source selection phase of the contract management process to perform their 
procurement fraud investigative duties. Agents had five options to select ranging 
from“strongly agree” to “strongly disagree,” or “I don’t know.” Here, “n” represents the 
number of respondents selecting a specific response (strongly agree – I don’t know), 
while the average overall knowledge score for each response is identifed as a percent. 
(5) Contract administration 
When asked about the contract administration phase (Phase 5) of the contract 
management process, the majority of the agents, 58 percent (n=26), selected “agree” 
(Figure 30). The least selected responses were, “strongly agree,” 4 percent of the agents 
(n=2), and “strongly disagree,” 4 percent of the agents (n=2) (Figure 30). None of the 
respondents selected “I don’t know” (n=0) (Figure 30). The perception mean for all 
respondents was 3.36 on the Likert Scale (Table 3), which indicates a general perception 
of slightly above “neutral” about their knowledge on the contract administration phase. 
However, the average overall score among all respondents for the knowledge-based 
questions on the contract administration phase of the contract management process was 
56 percent (Figure 7). By academic standards, this would be equivalent to a grade of “F.” 
Out of the 45 respondents, 4 percent of the agents (n=2), selected “strongly agree” 
when  asked  if  they  perceived  that  they  had  adequate  knowledge  of  the  contract 
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procurement fraud investigative duties (Figure 30). The average overall score for these 
agents on contract administration phase related knowledge questions was 90 percent 
(Figure 30). By academic standards, this would be equivalent to a grade of “A.” 
Additionally, 58 percent of the agents (n=26) selected “agree” when asked if they 
perceived that they had adequate knowledge of the contract administration phase of the 
contract management process to perform procurement fraud investigative duties (Figure 
30). However, agents that selected “agree” achieved an average overall score of 62 
percent on contract administration phase related knowledge questions (Figure 30). By 
academic standards, this would be equivalent to a grade of “D.” 
In order to assess the knowledge of the respondents with the perception that they 
had adequate knowledge, responses of “agree” and “strongly agree” were combined and 
assessed. In the contract administration phase, 62 percent of the agents (n=28) responded 
with “agree” or “strongly agree.” Despite the perception that they had sufficient 
knowledge, when analyzed, the average overall score of these agents for this phase was 
64 percent. By academic standards, this would be equivalent to a grade of “D.” In 
comparison,  CFEs  achieved  an  average  overall  score  of  68  percent  on  knowledge 
questions in this phase. 
In contrast, 4 percent of the agents (n=2), selected “strongly disagree” when asked 
if they perceived that they had adequate knowledge of the contract administration phase 
of the contract management process to perform procurement fraud investigative duties 
(Figure 30). The average overall score for agents selecting “strongly disagree” was 50 
percent (Figure 30). By academic standards, this would be equivalent to a grade of “F.” 
Additionally, agents that selected “disagree” (22 percent; n=10) scored an average overall 
score of 38 percent on knowledge questions pertaining to the contract administration 
phase on the assessment (Figure 30). By academic standards, this would be equivalent to 
the grade of “F.” Figure 30 shows the average overall score of agents on knowledge 
questions  relating  to  the  contract  administration  phase  of  the  contract  management 
process based on their perception of knowledge for this phase. 
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Figure 30. Average Score by Perception of Knowledge of Contract 
Administration 
AFOSI Agents participating in the assessment rated their perception of their knowledge 
about the contract administration phase of the contract management process to perform 
procurement fraud investigative duties. Agents had five options to select ranging 
from“strongly agree” to “strongly disagree,” or “I don’t know.” Here, “n” represents the 
number of respondents selecting a specific response (strongly agree – I don’t know), 
while the average overall knowledge score for each response is identifed as a percent. 
(6) Contract closeout/termination 
When asked about the contract closeout/termination phase (Phase 6) of the 
contract management process, the majority of the agents, 51 percent (n=23), selected 
“agree” (Figure 31). The least selected responses were, “strongly agree,” 2 percent of the 
agents (n=1), and “strongly disagree,” 2 percent of the agents (n=1) (Figure 31). None of 
the respondents selected “I don’t know” (n=0) (Figure 31). The perception mean for all 
respondents was 3.20 on the Likert Scale (Table 3), which indicates a general perception 
of slightly above “neutral” about their knowledge on the contract closeout/termination 
phase. However, the average overall score among all respondents for the knowledge- 
based questions on the contract closeout/termination phase of the contract management 
process was 72 percent (Figure 7). By academic standards, this would be equivalent to a 
grade of “C.” 
Out of the 45 respondents, 2 percent of the agents (n=1), selected “strongly agree” 
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closeout/termination phase (Phase 6) of the contract management process to perform 
procurement fraud investigative duties (Figure 31). The average overall score for these 
agents on contract closeout/termination phase related knowledge questions was 50 
percent (Figure 31). By academic standards, this would be equivalent to a grade of “F.” 
Additionally, 51 percent of the agents (n=23) selected “agree” when asked if they 
perceived that they had adequate knowledge of the contract closeout/termination phase of 
the contract management process to perform procurement fraud investigative duties 
(Figure 31). However, agents that selected “agree” achieved an average overall score of 
78 percent on contract closeout/termination phase related knowledge questions (Figure 
31). By academic standards, this would be equivalent to a grade of “C.” 
In order to assess the knowledge of the respondents with the perception that they 
had adequate knowledge, responses of “agree” and “strongly agree” were combined and 
assessed. In the contract closeout/termination phase, 53 percent of the agents (n=24) 
responded with “agree” or “strongly agree.” Despite the perception that they had 
sufficient knowledge, when analyzed, the average overall score of these agents for this 
phase was 77 percent. By academic standards, this would be equivalent to a grade of “C.” 
In comparison, CFEs achieved an average overall score of 88 percent on knowledge 
questions in this phase. 
In contrast, 2 percent of the agents (n=1), selected “strongly disagree” when asked 
if they perceived that they had adequate knowledge of the contract closeout/termination 
phase of the contract management process to perform procurement fraud investigative 
duties (Figure 31). The average overall score for agents selecting “strongly disagree” was 
50 percent (Figure 31). By academic standards, this would be equivalent to a grade of 
“F.” Additionally, agents that selected “disagree” (31 percent; n=14) scored an average 
overall score of 68 percent on knowledge questions pertaining to the contract 
closeout/termination phase on the assessment (Figure 31). By academic standards, this 
would be equivalent to the grade of “D.” Figure 31 shows the average overall score of 
agents on knowledge questions relating to the contract closeout/termination phase of the 
contract management process based on their perception of knowledge for this phase. 
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Figure 31. Average Score by Perception of Knowledge of Contract 
Closeout/Termination 
AFOSI Agents participating in the assessment rated their perception of their knowledge 
about the contract closeout/termination phase of the contract management process to 
perform procurement fraud investigative duties. Agents had five options to select ranging 
from“strongly agree” to “strongly disagree,” or “I don’t know.” Here, “n” number of 
respondents selecting a specific response (strongly agree – I don’t know), while the 
average overall knowledge score for each response is identifed as a percent. 
(7) Procurement Fraud Schemes 
When asked about procurement fraud schemes, the majority of the agents, 56 
percent (n=25), selected “agree” (Figure 32). The least selected response, 4 percent of the 
agents (n=2), was “neutral” (Figure 32). None of the respondents selected “strongly 
disagree” (n=0) nor “I don’t know” (n=0) (Figure 32). The perception mean for all 
respondents was 4.09 on the Likert Scale (Table 3), which indicates a general perception 
of slightly above “agree” about their knowledge on procurement fraud schemes. 
However, the average overall score among all respondents for the knowledge-based 
questions on the procurement fraud schemes was 75 percent (Figure 7). By academic 
standards, this would be equivalent to a grade of “C.” 
Out of the 45 respondents, 31 percent of the agents (n=14), selected “strongly 
agree” when asked if they perceived that they had adequate knowledge of procurement 
fraud  schemes  to  perform  procurement  fraud  investigative  duties  (Figure  32).  The 
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questions was 75 percent (Figure 32). By academic standards, this would be equivalent to 
a grade of “C.” Additionally, 56 percent of the agents (n=25) selected “agree” when 
asked if they perceived that they had adequate knowledge of the procurement fraud 
schemes to perform procurement fraud investigative duties (Figure 32). However, agents 
that selected “agree” achieved an average overall score of 75 percent on procurement 
fraud  scheme  related  knowledge  questions  (Figure  32).  By academic  standards,  this 
would be equivalent to a grade of “C.” 
In order to assess the knowledge of the respondents with the perception that they 
had adequate knowledge, responses of “agree” and “strongly agree” were combined and 
assessed. With regard to procurement fraud schemes, 87 percent of the agents (n=39) 
responded with “agree” or “strongly agree.” Despite the perception that they had 
sufficient knowledge, when analyzed, the average overall score of these agents for 
questions related to procurement fraud schemes was 75 percent. By academic standards, 
this would be equivalent to a grade of “C.” In comparison, CFEs achieved an average 
overall score of 81 percent on knowledge questions in this phase. 
In contrast, none of the agents selected “strongly disagree” and 9 percent of the 
agents (n=4), selected “disagree” when asked if they perceived that they had adequate 
knowledge of the procurement fraud schemes to perform procurement fraud investigative 
duties (Figure 32). The average overall score for agents selecting “disagree” was 79 
percent (Figure 32). By academic standards, this would be equivalent to a grade of “C.” 
Figure 32 shows the average overall score of agents on knowledge questions relating to 
procurement fraud schemes based on their perception of knowledge of procurement fraud 
schemes. 
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Figure 32. Average Score by Perception of Knowledge of Procurement Fraud 
AFOSI Agents participating in the assessment rated their perception of their knowledge 
about procurement fraud schemes to perform procurement fraud investigative duties. 
Agents had five options to select ranging from“strongly agree” to “strongly disagree,” or 
“I don’t know.” Here, “n” represents the number of respondents selecting a specific 
response (strongly agree – I don’t know), while the average overall knowledge score for 
each response is identifed as a percent. 
(8) Adequacy of AFOSI Training on Contracting 
When asked about the adequacy of AFOSI training on “contracting,” the majority 
of the agents, 36 percent (n=16), selected “disagree.” The least selected response was, 
“strongly agree,” 4 percent (n=2). None of the respondents selected “I don’t know” 
(n=0). The perception mean for all respondents was 2.69 on the Likert Scale (Table 3), 
which indicates a general perception of slightly below “neutral” about the adequacy of 
AFOSI training on “contracting.” 
It is interesting that more than half of the agents that participated in this research, 
51 percent (n=23), selected “disagree” or “strongly disagree” and assessed the training 
available within AFOSI on contracting as inadequate to effectively investigate 
procurement fraud. Conversely, 31 percent of the agents (n=14) perceived that they had 
adequate training. Additionally, regardless of the agents’ perception of the AFOSI 
training on “contracting,” the result of all of the knowledge-based questions was an 
average overall score of 61 percent among all of the respondents. 
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D. IMPLICATIONS 
Based on the research findings, there may be implications for AFOSI procurement 
fraud investigators. As previously discussed, competent personnel is one of the key 
aspects of auditability. Without auditability, the Air Force is highly susceptible to 
procurement fraud. The assessment results suggest that, perhaps, AFOSI procurement 
fraud agents are not as competent as they should be, specifically in terms of contract 
management. In order to be effective procurement fraud investigators, AFOSI 
procurement fraud agents may require additional knowledge of contracting processes. In 
order to close this knowledge gap, some recommendations are provided that may enable 
AFOSI procurement fraud agents to gain a better understanding of the contract 
management process and, therefore, be better equipped to identify procurement fraud 
indicators earlier in the contract management process. 
Perhaps one of the most significant implications of AFOSI agents’ performance 
on the assessment is that the training provided to agents may be imbalanced. The analysis 
showed that the average score of AFOSI agents was 61 percent on the knowledge portion 
of the assessment. From an academic standpoint, this score is equivalent to a grade of 
“D.” Additionally, 74 percent of the agents that participated in this research scored below 
70 percent on the knowledge assessment, which is less than the general academic average 
grade of “C.” The sample population in this research represented approximately half of 
AFOSI’s procurement fraud agents. While this is not an indication of poor performance 
or an inability to investigate procurement fraud, it may suggest that investigators may not 
have a strong enough  foundation  on the contract management process  to efficiently 
investigate procurement fraud. 
One possible explanation for the low scores is that, perhaps, AFOSI agents’ 
procurement fraud training is focused more on fraud in general and not specifically on 
procurement fraud and its relation to the contract management process. Although agents 
are encouraged to attend additional and advanced contract and procurement fraud training 
by senior leadership, it is not mandatory. Gaffney and Essex (2014) analyzed the AFOSI 
procurement fraud body of knowledge and compared it to the body of knowledge used in 
ACFE training certification guides to identify overlaps and gaps in  AFOSI training. 
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During initial AFOSI training, agents receive an overview of the procurement process; 
however, the level of training provided may not be sufficient to properly equip agents to 
understand the contract management process (USAFSIA, 2014c). Procurement fraud 
investigation is a major AFOSI mission, which encompasses 12 percent of the 41 total 
fraud competencies required for agents to be credentialed by the AFOSI (Gaffney & 
Essex, 2014). As a result of the findings in this research, training that is more specific 
may be needed to ensure agents understand the contract management process. 
Chang (2013) and Castillo and Flanigan (2014) reported that contracting officers 
in both the Army and the Air Force did not suspect procurement fraud or consider their 
organizations vulnerable to procurement fraud schemes. In addition, the contracting 
officers’ generally had low scores on knowledge-based questions relating to procurement 
fraud even though they self-reported that they had enough procurement fraud knowledge 
to do their job. This indicates that contracting officers may not have the necessary 
knowledge or understanding required to identify procurement fraud schemes (Castillo & 
Flanigan, 2014; Chang, 2013). 
In this research study, according to the results of the perception questions, 56 
percent of the AFOSI respondents perceived they had adequate knowledge of the contract 
management process to sufficiently investigate procurement fraud. Moreover, according 
to the results of the perception questions, 87 percent of the AFOSI respondents perceived 
they had adequate knowledge of procurement fraud schemes to perform procurement 
fraud investigative duties. However, the overall results of the knowledge-based questions 
did not correspond to these perceptions, as the average overall score for contract 
management process knowledge-based questions was 61 percent among all respondents 
while the average overall score for procurement fraud scheme questions was 75 percent 
among all respondents. It is interesting to note that despite the aforementioned results of 
the perception questions, 52 percent of the agents indicated that they did not perceive 
AFOSI provided  adequate  training on  contracting in  order  to  effectively investigate 
procurement fraud. 
These  findings  suggest  that  AFOSI  agents  may  be  over-confident  in 
their knowledge of the contract management process.  When combined with the over-  
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confidence of contracting officers’ knowledge of procurement fraud as indicated byChang 
(2013) and Castillo and Flanigan (2014), there may be a significant knowledge gap in 
the competent people component of the auditability triangle. This could greatly hinder 
the ability to identify and investigate procurement fraud within the contract management 
process. This is especially significant when considering Tan’s (2013) research, which 
indicated that the source selection and contract administration phases of the contract 
management process were the most vulnerable to procurement fraud schemes. It 
should also be noted that procurement fraud is six times more likely to occur in the 
contract administration phase than in any other phase of the contract management 
process (as cited in Tan, 2013). 
In this research study, the average overall score for all AFOSI respondents was 57 
percent in the source selection phase and 56 percent in the contract administration phase 
(Figure 7). By academic standards, these scores would be equivalent to grades of “F.” If 
neither contracting officers nor procurement fraud investigators have sufficient 
knowledge to detect procurement fraud red flags, the Air Force may be more vulnerable 
to procurement fraud than previously perceived. This may indicate that, perhaps, 
additional training on the contract management process may make AFOSI agents more 
knowledgeable  and,  therefore,  more  effective  at  identifying  and  even  investigating 
procurement fraud. 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS BASE ON ANALYSIS 
Based on the results of this research, a better understanding of the contract 
management process may enable AFOSI procurement fraud agents to identify 
procurement fraud earlier in the contract management process. Based on the analysis, the 
following recommendations have been identified as possible approaches that AFOSI may 
consider  in  the  development  of  procurement  fraud  agents  to  enhance  applicable 
knowledge levels. 
a. Training 
In order to understand and remain knowledgeable about the contract management 
process and procurement fraud, agents assigned to the Office of Procurement Fraud must 
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be developed in a manner that is rooted in the latest changes as well as historic trends of 
procurement fraud. Moreover, while knowledge of all the different phases of the contract 
management process is important, due to the current risk and vulnerability associated 
with the source selection and contract administration phases of the contract management 
process as reported by Tan (2013), agents should consider a more in-depth understanding 
of these areas. While agents are able to partner with Air Force contracting officers for 
assistance when needed, they cannot always rely on contracting officers to assist them 
throughout an investigation. Additionally, having a better understanding of the contract 
management  process  and  related  terminology may enhance  the  relationship  between 
AFOSI and contracting organizations. 
Based on the analysis, it is recommended that AFOSI agents assigned to 
procurement fraud units attend training similar to the Defense Acquisition University 
(DAU) Mission Ready Contracting Officer’s Course as part of their assignment to a PFU. 
Although this training is made available to agents, many do not attend (C. Collins, 
personal interview, June 29, 2015). This research also suggests that AFOSI procurement 
fraud training may not be properly balanced with adequate focus on the phases of the 
contract management process. More than half of the agents who participated in this 
research did not feel they were adequately trained in contract management to investigate 
procurement fraud. Mandating fraud agents to take DAU specific contracting courses 
may help close the knowledge gap and possibly enable agents to be more efficient at 
identifying procurement fraud. 
AFOSI agents do not need a level of knowledge that is equal to contracting 
officers; however, there should be a command standard knowledge level for AFOSI 
procurement fraud agents comparable to other AFOSI specialized missions. In order to 
properly establish a required understanding of the contract management process, a new 
training could be developed with a focus on “contract management for procurement fraud 
investigators.” This training may be a prerequisite for agents prior to an initial assignment 
to a Procurement Fraud Unit (PFU). Additionally, training should not merely be 
encouraged, but considered a mandatory component of professional development. With 
this type of deliberate development of procurement fraud agents, AFOSI will produce 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 96 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
capable and efficient procurement fraud investigators as well as leaders for the AFOSI 
Office of Procurement Fraud. Moreover, it may cultivate future leaders of PFUs who will 
have the necessary understanding of procurement fraud and the contract management 
process enabling them to investigate procurement fraud more effectively and efficiently. 
b. Certifications 
While training alone will likely benefit procurement fraud agents, additional steps 
could be taken to develop procurement fraud agents as professionals in the industry. 
Similar to agents attending training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center 
(FLETC)  to 
certifications 
counterparts. 
transform  agent  trainees  into  credentialed  federal  agents,  professional 
would  put   AFOSI  procurement   fraud   agents   on  par   with   agency 
(1) Occupational Certifications 
Based on this research, it is recommended that AFOSI leadership require 
procurement fraud agents to earn and maintain a DAU, or equivalent, certification. This 
may include a currently offered certification, or perhaps, a new, specialized acquisition 
code. Agents assigned to PFUs could be given a special acquisition code requiring them 
to earn continuous learning points to maintain certification level. Agents could then have 
the option to maintain the certification upon reassignment outside of the Office of 
Procurement Fraud. The certification standards would include topics on procurement 
fraud as well as the contract management process. 
(2) Professional Certifications 
Agents that were CFEs that participated in this research scored an average of 14 
percent higher than those without the certification. ACFE is the certifying professional 
association for fraud investigators and requires 40 credit hours of continuing professional 
education (CPE) every two years to maintain the certification (Essex & Gaffney, 2014). 
In order to promote an investigative force that is up to date on the latest information on 
the contract management process as well as procurement fraud, AFOSI should consider 
sponsoring procurement fraud agents, who meet pre-determined criteria as identified by 
AFOSI, to earn the CFE certification. Maintaining this certification will also ensure that  
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procurement fraud agents remain sharp in their ability to investigate procurement fraud. 
Acquisition professionals, such as contracting officers, are also encouraged to obtain 
certifications from professional associations like the National Contract Management 
Association (NCMA). These professional associations offer training and resources as 
well as provide a network to increase the body of knowledge that will foster learning that 
is  necessary  in  an  industry  that  is  constantly  evolving  with  updated  policies  and 
regulations. 
c. Academic Education 
In order to develop capable and competent procurement fraud agents as well as 
leaders of procurement fraud units, it is recommended that AFOSI seek additional billets 
and send more procurement fraud agents to the Naval Postgraduate School’s (NPS) 
government acquisition and contract management master’s degree program. The level of 
instruction and learning that takes place at NPS would provide agents an enhanced level 
of knowledge and understanding that would better equip them to navigate the dynamics 
of contract management. Additionally, the DAU accepts equivalency credit for many of 
the courses in the NPS government acquisition and contract management curriculum. 
Finally,  NPS  students  have  the  opportunity  to  earn  several  different  professional 
certifications such as those offered by NCMA and ACFE. 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the results of the assessment by discussing the findings, 
analysis, and implications of this research. Findings were analyzed according to 
employment category, experience in AFOSI, experience investigating procurement fraud, 
and by CFE certification. Findings were evaluated according to each phase of the contract 
management process as well as procurement fraud schemes. Findings were also analyzed 
and compared to the results from the perception questions of the assessment tool. 
Additionally, the findings and analysis were compared to previous research in order to 
identify potential implications. Lastly, recommendations were provided to improve the 
knowledge level of AFOSI procurement fraud agents. The purpose of this research was to 
assess  AFOSI’s  procurement  fraud  agents’  knowledge  of  the  contract  management 
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process  and  procurement  fraud  schemes,  as  well  as  to  evaluate  their perception  of 
knowledge in those areas. The next chapter, 
conclusions, and areas for future research. 
Chapter VI, will present the summary, 
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
A. SUMMARY 
The Department of Defense’s (DOD) contracting function plays a vital role in the 
success of the mission. The magnitude of contracted supplies and services demands that 
public officials ensure taxpayer dollars are spent wisely. This increased reliance on 
contract support has made it more difficult to ensure integrity, accountability, and 
transparency in government operations (Cohen & Eimicke, 2008). Therefore, to prevent 
fraud, waste, and abuse in federal contracting, organizations must be auditable (Rendon 
& Rendon, 2015). Auditability requires competent people, capable processes, and 
effective internal controls (Rendon & Rendon), 2015). To ensure auditability in the 
procurement environment and protect against fraud, waste, and abuse, the DOD needs 
procurement fraud investigators to be competent in the contract management process and 
procurement fraud schemes. 
The  purpose  of  this  research  was  to  assess  the  Air  Force  Office  of  Special 
Investigation’s (AFOSI) procurement fraud agents’ knowledge 
management  process  and  procurement  fraud  schemes,  as  well  as 
perception  of  knowledge  in  those  areas.  The  AFOSI  has  the 
of the contract 
to  evaluate  their 
responsibility  of 
investigating allegations of procurement fraud. While any AFOSI agent could be called 
upon to assist with a procurement fraud investigation, procurement fraud investigations 
are typically relegated to agents assigned to a Procurement Fraud Unit (PFU). The 
potential pool of AFOSI procurement fraud agents who were surveyed in this research 
had varying backgrounds and years of experience working in AFOSI. The research 
methodology was presented to show how data was collected to assess AFOSI 
procurement fraud agents’ knowledge of the contract management process and 
procurement fraud schemes as well as their perception of their knowledge in those areas. 
The methodology consisted of a survey instrument that served as the assessment tool. The 
assessment tool was deployed to the 83 total AFOSI agents assigned to procurement 
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fraud units. The questions used in the assessment included knowledge-based, perception- 
based, and demographic questions. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
This research project consisted of three research questions. Below are the research 
questions and summary findings from the research. 
1. What are AFOSI procurement fraud agents’ knowledge levels of the 
phases of the contract management process? 
The average overall score on the knowledge-based questions for all procurement 
fraud agents who participated in this research was 61 percent. Between the military and 
civilian agents who participated in this research, civilian agents out-performed the 
military with an average score of 67 percent versus officer agents who scored an average 
of 56 percent and enlisted agents who scored an average of 54 percent (Figure 9). Agents 
with a Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE) credential scored 17 percent higher on questions 
relating to the phases of the contract management process than those without the CFE 
credential. 
The results of the assessment showed the average overall score among all 
respondents for the procurement planning phase (Phase 1) was 60 percent (Figure 7). 
Agents scored the lowest in the solicitation planning phase (Phase 2) with an average 
overall score of 32 percent among all respondents (Figure 7). Agents had the highest 
overall score in the solicitation phase (Phase 3) with an average overall score among all 
respondents of 87 percent (Figure 7). The average overall score among all respondents 
for the source selection phase (Phase 4) was 57 percent (Figure 7). The average overall 
score among all respondents for the contract administration phase (Phase 5) was 56 
percent (Figure 7). The average overall score among all respondents for the contract 
closeout/termination phase (Phase 6) was 72 percent (Figure 7). It is interesting to note 
that procurement fraud agents’ years of experience in AFOSI and investigating 
procurement fraud did have an impact on the knowledge levels as reflected in the average 
overall scores. 
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Based on these findings, because procurement fraud agents are supposed to be 
knowledgeable of the contract management process and procurement fraud schemes, 
procurement fraud agents may benefit from having more knowledge of the contract 
management process. The results of this assessment suggest that the AFOSI fraud agent 
training is imbalanced and may need to be re-focused to include more training on the 
contract management process. 
2. What are AFOSI procurement fraud agents’ knowledge levels of 
contracting as related to procurement fraud schemes? 
The procurement fraud scheme knowledge was analyzed separately and the 
average overall score among all respondents for procurement fraud schemes questions 
was 75 percent (Figure 7). The assessment included one question related to procurement 
fraud schemes within each phase of the contract management process. Scores among 
civilian, officer, and enlisted agents were very similar. Civilian and enlisted agents both 
scored an average of 75 percent (Figure 12 and Figure 18 respectively) while officer 
agents scored slightly higher with an average of 77 percent (Figure 15). It is interesting to 
note that procurement fraud agents’ years of experience in AFOSI and investigating 
procurement fraud had little impact on the knowledge of procurement fraud schemes as 
reflected in the scores. 
The average overall score among all respondents for the procurement fraud 
scheme question related to the procurement planning phase (Phase 1) was 93 percent. The 
average overall score among all respondents for the procurement fraud scheme question 
related to the solicitation planning phase (Phase 2) was also 93 percent. The average 
overall score among all respondents for the procurement fraud scheme question related to 
the solicitation phase (Phase 3) was 91 percent. The average overall score among all 
respondents for the procurement fraud scheme question related to the source selection 
phase (Phase 4) was 17 percent. The average overall score among all respondents for the 
procurement fraud scheme question related to the contract administration phase (Phase 5) 
was 96 percent. The average overall score among all respondents for the procurement 
fraud scheme question related to the contract closeout/termination phase (Phase 6) was 59 
percent.  Agents  with a Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE) credential scored 8 percent 
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higher on questions relating to procurement fraud schemes within the phases of the 
contract management process than those without the CFE credential. 
From an academic standpoint, the agents who participated in this research scored 
significantly high (overall scores ranged from 91 percent to 96 percent) on the majority of 
the procurement fraud scheme questions. However, failing scores on procurement fraud 
scheme questions related to the source selection and contract closeout/termination phases 
brought the average overall score down. These findings suggest that generally 
procurement fraud agents have adequate knowledge of procurement fraud schemes to 
investigate procurement fraud; however, agents may benefit from additional training in 
the source selection and contract closeout/termination phases. This is especially true 
given the findings from Tan’s (2013) research, which indicated that the source selection 
and contract administration phases of the contract management process were the most 
vulnerable to procurement fraud schemes. 
3. What are AFOSI procurement fraud agents’ perceptions of their 
knowledge of the contract management process and procurement 
fraud schemes? 
The assessment tool in this research included eight perception questions. Six of 
the questions were devoted to agents’ perceptions of their knowledge related to each 
contract management phase and whether they felt they had enough knowledge of that 
phase to investigate procurement fraud. The total overall perception mean among all 
respondents on all of the perception questions was 3.28 on the Likert Scale (Table 3), 
which is slightly above “neutral.” This relates to the average overall score of the 
knowledge-based questions pertaining to the contract management process, which was 61 
percent. 
Within each phase of the contract management process, the perception mean for 
the procurement planning phase was 3.16 on the Likert Scale (Table 3) indicating a 
general perception of slightly above “neutral.” However, the average overall score for 
knowledge questions on the procurement planning phase was 60 percent (Figure 7). The 
perception mean for the solicitation planning phase was 3.24 on the Likert Scale (Table 
3) indicating a general perception of slightly above “neutral.” However, the average 
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overall score for knowledge questions on the solicitation planning phase was 32 percent 
(Figure 7). The perception mean for the solicitation phase was 3.36 on the Likert Scale 
(Table 3) indicating a general perception of slightly above “neutral.” The average overall 
score for knowledge questions on the solicitation phase was 87 percent (Figure 7). The 
perception mean for the source selection phase was 3.38 on the Likert Scale (Table 3) 
indicating a general perception of slightly above “neutral.” However, the average overall 
score for knowledge questions on the source selection phase was 57 percent (Figure 7). 
The perception mean for the contract administration phase was 3.36 on the Likert Scale 
(Table 3) indicating a general perception of slightly above “neutral.” However, the 
average overall score for knowledge questions on the contract administration phase was 
56 percent (Figure 7). The perception mean for the contract closeout/termination phase 
was 3.20 on the Likert Scale (Table 3) indicating a general perception of slightly above 
“neutral.” However, the average overall score for knowledge questions on the contract 
closeout/termination phase was 72 percent (Figure 7). 
In addition to the questions on agents’ perceptions of their knowledge on the 
contract management process, one of the perception questions asked if agents felt they 
had enough knowledge of procurement fraud schemes to investigate procurement fraud. 
The perception mean for this question was 4.09 on the Likert Scale (Table 3) indicating a 
general perception of slightly above “agree.” Based on this result, most agents perceived 
that they had enough knowledge of procurement fraud schemes to perform fraud 
investigative duties. The average overall score for procurement fraud schemes among all 
respondents was 75 percent, suggesting that agents do have enough knowledge to 
investigate procurement fraud. The perception mean for AFOSI providing adequate 
training to effectively investigate procurement fraud was 2.69 on the Likert Scale (Table 
3) indicating a general perception of slightly below “neutral.” It is interesting that over 51 
percent of the procurement fraud agents who responded to this research indicated 
“disagree” or “strongly disagree” when asked if they perceived that AFOSI provided 
adequate training on contracting to effectively investigate procurement fraud. 
It is important to note that the research results do not indicate a failure in an 
agent’s  ability  to  investigate  procurement  fraud,  nor  do  they  suggest  poor  job 
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performance. The findings of this research suggest that there may be areas in which 
AFOSI could improve their fraud-training curriculum. 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This research continues a stream of research on ensuring auditability in 
government contracting, specifically focusing on having competent people involved in all 
areas of the contract management process. While the assessment tool was designed to be 
comprehensive, 27 knowledge-based questions may not be sufficient to adequately assess 
an agent’s knowledge of the contract management process, procurement fraud schemes, 
or an agent’s ability to conduct procurement fraud investigations. Accordingly, one area 
for further research might include modifying and increasing the number of questions to 
assess  a  broader  range  of  knowledge  within  the  contract  management  process  and 
procurement fraud schemes. 
The final perception question on the assessment tool for this research found that 
the majority of agents felt that AFOSI did not provide adequate training on contracting. 
This perception is confirmed in the average overall low score on the knowledge-based 
questions of the assessment. If AFOSI provided additional training to procurement fraud 
agents, another area for further research might include identifying the number of 
advanced training courses available to AFOSI procurement fraud agents and reassessing 
their knowledge. This further research may identify how the agents taking the additional 
training affected agents’ knowledge scores on the phases of the contract management 
process. 
Furthermore, while this research primarily focused on AFOSI procurement fraud 
agents, this research can be applied to other government agencies charged with 
investigating procurement fraud. This assessment tool could be used to assess the Army 
Criminal Investigative Division (CID), Navy Criminal Investigative Services (NCIS), 
Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), and other DOD agencies’ procurement 
fraud agents on their knowledge of the contract management process. In the DOD, many 
contingency fraud investigation units are comprised of agents from different services 
including  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  (FBI).  This  research  can  be  used  to 
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establish a baseline knowledge level for all procurement fraud investigative units to 
ensure agents from different services can 
efficiently. 
operate and investigate procurement fraud 
The  assessment  tool  consisted  of 
procurement fraud agents felt that AFOSI 
only  one  question  to  determine  whether 
provided adequate training on the contract 
management process. The perception mean for this question was 2.09 on the Likert Scale 
(Table 3), which indicated a perception of slightly below “neutral.” Another area for 
further research would be to expand on this area and assess not only procurement fraud 
agents’ needs, but also their desire for additional training on the contract management 
process. Further research may involve interviewing procurement fraud agents to 
determine how they have applied their knowledge of the contract management process to 
investigate procurement fraud allegations. 
Finally, further research might include interviewing contracting officers and 
procurement fraud investigators to assess the working environment between the 
organizations during an investigation. This may lead to the identification of inefficiencies 
in the investigative process as well as how gaps in the knowledge of procurement fraud 
schemes and the 
investigations. 
contract management process may have affected procurement fraud 
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